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Abstract
Nowadays the current network-centric world has given rise to several
security concerns regarding the access control management, which en-
sures that only authorized users are given access to certain resources
or tasks. In particular, according to their respective roles and respon-
sibilities, users are typically organized into hierarchies composed of
several disjoint classes (security classes). A hierarchy is characterized
by the fact that some users may have more access rights than others,
according to a top-down inclusion paradigm following specific hier-
archical dependencies. A user with access rights for a given class is
granted access to objects stored in that class, as well as to all the de-
scendant ones in the hierarchy. The problem of key management for
such hierarchies consists in assigning a key to each class of the hierar-
chy, so that the keys for descendant classes can be efficiently obtained
from users belonging to classes at a higher level in the hierarchy.
In this thesis we analyze the security of hierarchical key assignment
schemes according to different notions: security with respect to key
indistinguishability and against key recovery [4], as well as the two
recently proposed notions of security with respect to strong key in-
distinguishability and against strong key recovery [42]. More precisely,
we first explore the relations between all security notions and, in par-
ticular, we prove that security with respect to strong key indistin-
guishability is not stronger than the one with respect to key indistin-
guishability. Afterwards, we propose a general construction yielding
a hierarchical key assignment scheme that ensures security against
strong key recovery, given any hierarchical key assignment scheme
which guarantees security against key recovery.
Moreover, we define the concept of hierarchical key assignment
schemes supporting dynamic updates, formalizing the relative secu-
rity model. In particular, we provide the notions of security with
respect to key indistinguishability and key recovery, by taking into ac-
count the dynamic changes to the hierarchy. Furthermore, we show
how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme supporting dy-
namic updates, by using as a building block a symmetric encryption
scheme. The proposed construction is provably secure with respect to
key indistinguishability, provides efficient key derivation and updat-
ing procedures, while requiring each user to store only a single private
key.
Finally, we propose a novel model that generalizes the conventional
hierarchical access control paradigm, by extending it to certain addi-
tional sets of qualified users. Afterwards, we propose two construc-
tions for hierarchical key assignment schemes in this new model, which
are provably secure with respect to key indistinguishability. In par-
ticular, the former construction relies on both symmetric encryption
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“Those who are enamored of practice without
theory are like a pilot who goes into a ship
without rudder or compass and never has any
certainty where he is going. Practice should
always be based upon a sound knowledge of
theory.”
— Leonardo Da Vinci, 1452-1519
1.1 Introduction
Nowadays the current network-centric world has given rise to several security
issues concerning the access control management, which ensures that only au-
thorized users are given access to certain resources or tasks. In particular, the
Internet has been created to design a resource network where users interact seam-
lessly and share information without needing to worry about the location of the
information or the path over which it is sent. Again, user interactivity and
information sharing on the Internet cause issues concerning data privacy and
performance in terms of accessibility. Those issues arise from the fact that it is
difficult to forecast and hard-code solutions to all the possible scenarios that an
application has to face during its execution, therefore, guaranteeing data privacy
under changing conditions is challenging. For example, as organizations increase
their dependence on network-based information systems for daily business, such
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organizations become more and more exposed to security threats, even though
they improve their efficiency and productivity. Although several techniques, such
as encryption and digital signatures have been proposed in the literature to pro-
tect data, a holistic approach for ensuring data security should be taken into
account. Such an approach should enforce access control policies based on data
contents, user qualifications, and other relevant contextual information. Conse-
quently, when dealing with the security of an information system, a large number
of concepts must be taken into account and several questions should be answered:
should I use cryptography? how do I generate keys? how do I change keys if I
think my system has been breached? do I have to re-encrypt all my data every
time I generate a new key for one class of data? do I have to be constantly
monitoring the system and intervening to update keys?
The access control problem deals with the ability to ensure that only autho-
rized users of a system are given access to some sensitive resources or tasks. In
general, users belonging to a given organization are grouped according to their
competencies and responsibilities in a certain number of disjoint classes, referred
to as security classes. The basic assumption is that the keys will be assigned to
groups, so that when the security policy provides a group with the access to some
data, the key can be used for decrypting the data that can be accessed by the
group. Of course, if the security policy changes frequently, group memberships
may change, requiring both new keys and re-encrypting the data accessible by
the group. Therefore, data and resources that can be accessed by a user are
based on its relative membership class. For example, in the healthcare scenario,
doctors can access data concerning their patients, such as diagnosis, medication
prescriptions, and laboratory tests, whereas, researchers can be limited to only
consult anonymous clinical information for studies.
The set of rules which characterizes the information flow between different
security classes in the system defines an access control policy. More precisely,
for any class in the system, the access control policy specifies the set of classes
which can be accessed by that class. Such a set is denoted as the accessible set of
the class. It is important to remark that according to their responsibilities and
rights, users can have overlapping permission accesses; indeed, users belonging to
different classes, might need to access some common data and resources. In detail,
2
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a permission allows a user to perform several well-defined operations. Permissions
are characterized by a hierarchy of access rights, hence, users are assigned roles
that define which permissions they can exercise and in what context. A role is a
set of operations that a user is allowed to perform on data and resources. Notice
that a user can have more than one role. In general, hierarchies can be created
to ensure access control according to the inherent structure of an organization.
It is easy to note that hierarchical access control policies are a natural way of
organizing users to reflect reflect their authority, responsibility and competency.
In fact, there are several scenarios where supervisors have the full privileges to
control the tasks of their subordinates, while the subordinates have no privileges
at all to access the supervisors’ tasks. Similar situations are very common in many
further scenarios, e.g., in the government, military and healthcare. Hierarchical
access control policies find a natural way of application also in the business and
in many other fields, such as the management of databases containing sensitive
information or the protection of industrial secrets.
It is important to point out that sometimes the conventional hierarchical
access control may be a limitation, since it could be necessary to provide some
particular sets of users, having specific access credentials, with access to the key
of a certain security class. This novel access control model finds a natural field
of application even when there is the need to manage unusual, exceptional or
emergency situations, which in general require special permissions. In particular,
consider the case in which the trust is based on a single entity, let it be a person or
an organization. Obviously, this may lead to abuses or violations by such entity,
as in the Snowden event [69], where a great deal of confidential information held
by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) was stolen. However, the NSA itself
has defined in the past some strict guidelines for limiting such abuses, namely,
the Orange Book [63] and Two-Person Authorization [17] [39], whose main goal
was to prevent a single user from viewing top-secret documents. The concept
upon which the guidelines are based is that, in general, somebody is less inclined
to do something dishonest if someone else is watching. In addition, the two
guidelines clearly state that the information within a system must be organized
in a “compartmental manner”, providing different levels of access and security
to each compartment. In this case, a simple protection may be the use of two
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or more “locks” to protect a given resource or activity, where each lock needs a
different key, owned by a different person. Thus, two or more people are needed
in order to grant the access to that resource or activity.
The Snowden event highlights the fact that the collaboration among several
users and organizations is preferable for gaining the permission to carry out a
given task or to access sensitive information. Such collaboration is needed so as
to ensure that the requested permission has been granted through the acceptance
and agreement among all the involved entities, thus preventing users from any
kind of abuse. In general, the collaboration characterizes any scenario where
more than one entity is required to achieve a specific authorization. More pre-
cisely, there are many real-world scenarios in which such a collaborative access
is necessary, i.e., where a user might have a sort of “pre-authorization” for the
access, but he may need to get the approval from someone else. For example, con-
sider the healthcare environment, which typically consists of several professional
profiles, such as doctors, nurses, etc.. In this environment, nurses may access
a subset of stored patient’s clinical data, while a doctor can usually access all
the data. However, it is important to emphasize that the doctor and nurse must
have the patient’s consent to access clinical information. In addition, a nurse
should not access all the information concerning a patient, unless she does not
gain the permission from both patient and doctor. Moreover, if a doctor wants
to access some clinical data without the explicit consent of the patient, he should
be granted permission from several entities, e.g., hospital administration, medical
committee, government authority, etc..
Again, the access to the workspace of a specific project branch could be
granted either directly to the project manager or to a set of project team mem-
bers. The same arguments apply to distributed cryptographic file systems [22]. A
further real field of application lies in the collaborative access to logs concerning
accesses and events, where the access can be achieved either by a single entity
(e.g., a communications authority) or by more of them, which cooperate with
each other. For example, the access might be allowed only if the judicial author-
ity cooperates with a given service provider. Another concrete example arises
from the military field, in which a decision can be taken by a single person with
a specific rank, by a certain number of his subordinates or more generally, by a
4
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given number of people with certain credentials, which do not have the authority
to decide on their own. Furthermore, consider a committee board composed of
several members and a general chair. In this context, the chair might be away for
personal reasons or could be in a situation which prevents him from making any
decisions for a given action. Only one member of the board cannot independently
take such a decision on behalf of the chair. However, the board members can col-
lectively take such a decision on behalf of the chair, as long as their number is
greater than or equal to a certain threshold.
Finally, advances in wireless communication and electronics have given rise
to the need of ensuring access control even in contexts characterized by high dy-
namicity. Thus, one of our goals has been to show how access control and cryp-
tographic key assignment can be combined to ensure dynamic and fine-grained
data security.
1.2 Cryptographic Hierarchical Access Control
and Key Assignment Schemes
An access control policy defines the set of rules characterizing the information
flow between different user classes in the system, and it can be represented by
a directed graph G = (V,E), where the vertex set V corresponds to the set of
security classes and there is a directed edge (u, v) ∈ E if and only if class u can
access class v. Again, each class has a self-loop. For each u ∈ V , we define the
accessible set of u as the set of classes that can be accessed by u. We also define
the incoming set of u as the set of classes that can access class u. Based on certain
characteristics, access control policies can be categorized as follows.
• Poset based access control policy. Many organizations are character-
ized by an inherent hierarchical structure and can be represented through
a partially ordered set (poset). More formally, a poset based access control
policy has the three following properties:
– Reflexive: A class u has access to its own data;
5
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– Antisymmetric: If a class u has access to the data of a class v and the
class v can access the data of u, then u and v are equivalent classes;
– Transitive: If a class u can access the data of a class v and the class v
can access the data of a class z, then the class u is able to access the
data of z.
• Arbitrary access control policy. There are many scenarios which cannot
be characterized by a strict hierarchy, thus requiring more general access
control policies. For example, an access control policy corresponding to
these scenarios may violate the anti-symmetric and transitive properties of
a partially ordered hierarchy. More formally, an arbitrary access control
policy has the two following properties:
– Reflexive: A class u has access to its own data;
– Equivalence: If the sets of classes that u and v can access are the same,
and the classes having access to the data of u are also authorized to
access the data of v and viceversa, then u and v are equivalent classes.
In the field of cryptography, an access control policy can be implemented by
means of a key assignment scheme, which is a method to assign an encryption
key and some private information to each class. The encryption key will be used
by each class to protect its own data, usually through a symmetric cryptosystem,
whereas, the private information will be used by each class to compute the keys
assigned to its accessible set. This assignment is carried out by a trusted authority,
referred to as TA, which is active only during the distribution phase. Specifically,
we consider how encryption keys can be used to reinforce the security of access
control schemes.
A basic and trivial cryptographic key assignment scheme requires each class
to store the encryption keys assigned to all classes in its accessible set. The
main drawback of this solution is that users in high level classes need to handle
more information than users in low level classes. It is easy to observe that low
space requirements and best performances enable a scheme to be used much more
extensively and in wider contexts than costly schemes. Therefore, an important
measure concerning the efficiency of a key assignment scheme is the size of the
6
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private information that each user stores to gain data accesses. Again, since the
derivation of a key could be performed in real-time, by users which may have
constrained hardware and software capabilities, it is important to design schemes
where the number of operations required to compute the key of the classes lower
down in the hierarchy is as small as possible. Obviously, also the operation
complexity should be as efficient as possible.
Furthermore, to improve the deployability of a key assignment scheme, also
access control policies which are more general than the hierarchical one should
be considered. Finally, to increase the effectiveness of a key assignment scheme,
it should be provided with the ability of managing dynamic access control poli-
cies. More precisely, in those schemes the topology of the access control policy
is allowed to change dynamically, i.e., classes and relations may be added to or
deleted from the system. As a consequence of any update, some private informa-
tion associated to particular classes may need to be updated. However, due to
efficiency reasons, it would be preferable that when any change takes place, the
number of classes involved in the update is as small as possible.
1.3 State of the Art
Akl and Taylor [2] first addressed the problem of reducing the inherent complexity
of the basic trivial key assignment scheme. In particular, they proposed an elegant
solution to solve the access control problem in systems organized as a partially
ordered hierarchy (poset). In their scheme, each class is assigned a key that can
be used later on, along with some public parameters generated by the TA, to
compute the key assigned to any class lower down in the hierarchy. Furthermore,
the scheme due to Akl and Taylor is secure against collusion attacks performed
by non-authorized classes. However, as the number of entities in the system
grows, so does the size of the keys held by higher level classes and the number
of computations required to derive lower level keys. In order to overcome the
above defined limitation, Mackinnon et al. [60] proposed an algorithm aimed at
determining an optimal assignment of keys by assigning the smallest primes to
the longest chains in the hierarchy.
Subsequently, many schemes have been proposed, which either have better
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performances or allow inserting and deleting classes in the hierarchy, as for ex-
ample the ones proposed in [27], [46], [61], [49], [58], [57], [59], [60], [64].
For instance, Sandhu [64] considered a significant type of hierarchy, i.e., a
rooted tree hierarchy. In his scheme, the key of a security class is generated
through the class identity and its parents’ secret key, by using a one-way function.
In 1990, Harn and Lin [46] proposed an approach that, instead of using a top-
down strategy as in the Akl-Taylor scheme, it uses a bottom-up key generation
approach. By doing this, the space required to store the public parameters for
security classes is much smaller than that required by the previous schemes.
However, when there are many security classes in the system, a large amount
of storage space is still required to store the public parameters. Subsequently,
Chang et al. [27] proposed a scheme based on Newton’s interpolation method and
using one-way functions. The main drawback is that all of those schemes can be
used to implement only poset-based access control policies.
The problem of designing cryptographic key assignment schemes for access
control policies with transitive and anti-symmetrical exceptions was first con-
sidered by Yeh et al. [72]. However, Hwang [50] showed that their scheme was
insecure against collusion attacks carried out by non-authorized classes.
It is important to point out that the above solutions deal with the access
control problem when the keys are assigned to users for an indefinite period of
time, and it is supposed that the only time in which it is necessary to re-assign
keys is when a user joins or leaves the system. However, in practical scenarios,
it is likely that users may belong to a class for a limited period of time. In
2002, Tzeng [70] proposed the first time-bound key assignment scheme to deal
with this situation. His proposed solution assumes that each class has a different
cryptographic key for each time period. The scheme is efficient in terms of space
requirements, but the computation of a key requires expensive public-key and
Lucas computations [56].
Afterwards, Bertino et al. [14] pointed out how key assignment schemes play
a fundamental role to enforce secure broadcasting of XML documents. In par-
ticular, they showed how to enforce access control on XML documents. This
is a very important feature for services where updates are sent to subscribers
which have access permissions for different portions of the same document. The
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hierarchical structure of an XML document allows to encrypt each different por-
tions of a document just once. The idea is to generate a single encrypted copy
of the document, where each different portion is encrypted by using a different
cryptographic key. Bertino et al. [14] used the Tzeng’s scheme to encrypt parts
of an XML document and distribute appropriate decryption keys to authorized
users. However, the Tzeng’s scheme was shown to be insecure against collusion
attacks in [73]. Then, a new time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme was
proposed by Huang and Chang [48], but Tang and Mitchell [68] analyzed the se-
curity of such a scheme and showed some vulnerabilities, which enable malicious
users to breach the privacy of other users. Subsequently, Chien [28] proposed
a time-bound key assignment scheme based on tamper-resistant devices. Again,
Bertino et al. [66] proposed an efficient hierarchical key generation and key diffu-
sion scheme for sensor networks. Finally, De Santis et al. [35] proposed a new key
assignment scheme for access control in a complete tree hierarchy. However, all
those schemes either require high computational load or lack of a formal security
proof.
According to the security reduction paradigm introduced by Goldwasser and
Micali [44], a scheme is provably-secure under a complexity assumption if the
existence of an adversary A breaking the scheme implies the existence of an
adversary B breaking the computational assumption [44]. Atallah et al. [4] first
addressed the problem of formalizing security requirements for hierarchical key
assignment schemes and proposed two different notions: security against key
recovery and with respect to key indistinguishability. Informally speaking, the
former captures the notion that an adversary should not be able to compute a
key to which it should not have access, while in the latter, the adversary should
not even be able to distinguish between the real key and a random string of
the same length. In particular, the model considered in [4] allows an adversary
attacking a certain class in the hierarchy to gain access to the private information
assigned to all users not allowed to access such a class, as well as all the public
information.
Atallah et al. [4] also proposed two provably-secure constructions for hierar-
chical key assignment schemes: the first one is based on pseudorandom functions
and satisfies security against key recovery, whereas, the second one requires the
9
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additional use of a symmetric encryption scheme and guarantees security with
respect to key indistinguishability. Different constructions satisfying the above
defined notions of security have been proposed in [8, 32, 6, 29, 30, 33, 38, 7, 41].
In particular, De Santis et al. [32, 33] proposed two different constructions sat-
isfying security with respect to key indistinguishability: the first one, which is
based on symmetric encryption schemes, is simpler than the one proposed in [4],
requires a single computational assumption, and offers more efficient procedures
for key derivation and key updates; the second one, which is based on a public-
key broadcast encryption scheme, allows to obtain a hierarchical key assignment
scheme offering constant private information and public information linear in the
number of classes. D’Arco et al. [29, 30] analyzed the Akl-Taylor scheme ac-
cording to the definitions proposed in [4] and showed how to choose the public
parameters in order to get instances of the scheme which are secure against key
recovery under the RSA assumption. Moreover, they showed how to turn the
Akl-Taylor scheme in a construction offering security with respect to key indis-
tinguishability; however, such a scheme is less efficient than the constructions
proposed in [4, 32, 33]. Then, Freire et al. [41] proposed a construction based
on factoring, satisfying security with respect to key indistinguishability. Again,
Ateniese et al. [8, 7] and De Santis et al. [36] extended the model proposed in [4]
to schemes satisfying additional time-dependent constraints and proposed two
different constructions offering security with respect to key indistinguishability.
Other constructions for time-dependent schemes, offering different trade-offs in
terms of amount of public and private information and complexity of key deriva-
tion, were shown in [37, 6, 38, 15].
Recently, Freire et al. [42] proposed new security definitions for hierarchical
key assignment schemes. Such definitions, called security against strong key re-
covery and security with respect to strong key indistinguishability, provide the
adversary with additional compromise capability, thus representing a strength-
ening of the model provided in [4]. As stated by Freire et al., such a new model
is able to characterize a variety of scenarios which may arise in real-world sit-
uations, since it allows the protection of the key assigned to a certain class u,
even when the keys held by classes which are predecessors of u in the hierarchy
have been leaked, due to their use, loss or theft. More precisely, Freire et al.
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considered an adversary which, given a certain class, is allowed to achieve the
private information assigned to all users not allowed to access such class, as well
as all the public information and keys assigned to all the other classes which are
predecessors of the attacked (target) class in the hierarchy. Freire et al. also pro-
posed two hierarchical key assignment schemes which are secure in the sense of
strong key indistinguishability. The former construction is based on pseudoran-
dom functions, whereas, the latter one is based on forward-secure pseudorandom
generators. Finally, they showed that the notions of security against key recovery
and against strong key recovery are separated, i.e., there exist schemes that are
secure against key recovery but which are not secure against strong key recov-
ery. On the other hand, they did not clarify the relations between the notions of
security with respect to key indistinguishability and with respect to strong key
indistinguishability.
1.4 Contributions of This Thesis
In this thesis we provide new insights on cryptographic hierarchical access control
and key assignment, in particular by focusing on models, schemes and security
notions, as well as on their relative analysis. As stated before, cryptographic
hierarchical access control is implemented by means of proper key assignment
schemes, which involve secret and public information generated and distributed
by the TA to the users, in order to set up the scheme. More precisely, in this thesis
we focus on cryptographic hierarchical access control schemes which are based on
dependent key management approaches, besides discussing the challenges involved
for extending them to deal with changing conditions and dynamic environments.
In general, we recall that dependent key management schemes organize users into
groups and assign each group a unique key. Afterwards, such a key can be used
either to decrypt data that the users are authorized to access or to derive the
keys of their accessible set. We remark that assigning groups single keys makes
security management easier for both the users and security administrator, since
it reduces the risks of mismanagement that could lead to security violations. Ob-
viously, it is important to construct schemes whose amount of public and secret
information is as small as possible. The efficiency of a hierarchical key assign-
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ment scheme is evaluated according to different parameters: storage requirements,
which correspond to the amount of secret data that needs to be distributed and
stored by the users and the amount of data that needs to be made public; the
complexity of both key derivation and key update procedures. Indeed, it is prefer-
able that updates to the access hierarchy, performed to reflect changes in access
permissions, require only local changes to the public information and do not need
any private information to be re-distributed; the computational assumption on
which the security of the scheme relies. In fact, it is preferable to rely on standard
assumptions.
In this thesis we analyze the security of hierarchical key assignment schemes
according to different notions, that is, security with respect to key indistinguisha-
bility and against key recovery, as well as the two recently proposed notions of
security with respect to strong key indistinguishability and against strong key
recovery. We first explore the relations between all security notions and, in par-
ticular, we prove that security with respect to strong key indistinguishability
is not stronger than the one with respect to key indistinguishability, thus an-
swering an important open question in the field of hierarchical key assignment
schemes. Afterwards, we propose a general construction yielding a hierarchical
key assignment scheme which ensures security against strong key recovery, given
any hierarchical key assignment scheme which guarantees security against key
recovery.
Moreover, we define the concept of hierarchical key assignment schemes sup-
porting dynamic updates, besides formalizing the relative security model. In par-
ticular, we provide the notions of security with respect to key indistinguishability
and key recovery, by taking into account the dynamic changes to the hierarchy.
Moreover, we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme sup-
porting dynamic updates, by using as a building block a symmetric encryption
scheme. The proposed construction is provably secure with respect to key indis-
tinguishability, provides efficient key derivation and updating procedures, while
requiring each user to store only a single private key.
Finally, we propose a novel model that generalizes the conventional hierarchi-
cal access control paradigm, by extending it to certain additional sets of quali-
fied users. Then, we propose two constructions for hierarchical key assignment
12
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schemes in this new model, which are provably secure with respect to key indis-
tinguishability. In particular, the former construction relies on both symmetric
encryption and perfect secret sharing, whereas, the latter is based on public-key
threshold broadcast encryption. We remark that in this thesis the security of
all the proposed hierarchical key assignment schemes rely on the computational
infeasibility of breaking it (computational security).
The motivations underlying this thesis are mainly based on two observations.
The first observation is that even though the simplicity of using password-based
authentication schemes has made them the “de facto” standard to enforce access
control, their vulnerability to even more sophisticated attacks has made cryp-
tographic alternatives or support for authentication schemes attractive. Unlike
authentication schemes relying on system-specific security policies, Cryptographic
access control (CAC) schemes have the advantage that their security is not based
on the physical security of the system on which the data is stored. Further-
more, since CAC schemes typically use data encryption to enforce access control,
unauthorized access is more difficult to gain, because the data remains encrypted
regardless of its location, and only a valid key can be used to decrypt it. The
second observation is that access control models are prone to failures (security vi-
olation or the inability to meet their goals), which arise from the fact that security
designers are likely to assume that if security schemes are correctly defined, fail-
ure is unlikely. As a consequence, cryptographic hierarchical access control has
gained popularity as a solution to design multilevel security models which are
more general and able to provide security in different contexts, without requiring
significant changes to the fundamental architecture.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
In this introduction we have provided an overview concerning the scenarios, mo-
tivations, state of the art and new insights on cryptographic hierarchical access
control and key assignment schemes. In the following chapters we develop the
formal frameworks and present our results.
The results presented in this thesis are based on joint works with Alfredo
De Santis, Barbara Masucci, Francesco Palmieri, Xinyi Huang and Jin Li. The
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organization of the rest of this thesis is as follows.
• Chapter 2: In this chapter we analyze and clarify all the relations exist-
ing between the security notions for Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes
(HKASs). More precisely, the most important contribution presented in
this chapter is the proof of the equivalence between the notions of key-
indistinguishability [4] and strong key indistinguishability [42], which an-
swers an important open question in the field of hierarchical key assignment
schemes. The results presented in this chapter can be found in [24].
• Chapter 3: In this chapter we formally extend the notions of security
proposed by Atallah et al. [4] to address the further changes introduced
by dynamic and adaptive updates to the access control hierarchy. More
precisely, in this chapter we introduce novel security definitions which are
able to model the behavior of an adversary that, besides being able to
corrupt a certain set of users, it is also able to modify dynamically the access
structure it intends to attack, according to the specific scenario. Again, we
propose a HKAS, based on symmetric encryption schemes, which is secure
with respect to our novel proposed model. The results presented in this
chapter can be found in [25].
• Chapter 4: In this chapter we extend the classical hierarchical access
control model to deal with scenarios which require the shared reconstruction
of the secret key. Moreover, we propose two HKASs, which are secure with
respect to the new model. More precisely, the former is based on symmetric
encryption schemes and perfect secret sharing schemes, whereas, the latter
is based on threshold broadcast encryption schemes. The results presented
in this chapter can be found in [23] [26].
• Chapter 5: Finally, in this chapter we conclude the thesis, by providing




In this thesis we use the standard notation to describe probabilistic algorithm
and experiments following [45]. If A(·, ·, . . .) is any probabilistic algorithm then
a ← A(x, y, . . .) denotes the experiment of running A on inputs x, y, . . . and
letting a be the outcome, the probability being over the coins of A. Similarly, if
X is a set, then x← X denotes the experiment of selecting an element uniformly
from X and assigning x this value. If w is neither an algorithm nor a set, then
x ← w is a simple assignment statement. A function ε : N → R is negligible if







for Hierarchical Key Assignment
Schemes
“A proof is whatever convinces me.”
— Shimon Even, 1935-2004
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we explore the relations between all security notions for hierar-
chical key assignment schemes, by clarifying implications and separations occur-
ring between such notions. In particular, we show that security with respect to
strong key indistinguishability is not stronger than the one with respect to key
indistinguishability, thus establishing the equivalence between such two security
notions. A similar result has been recently shown in the unconditionally secure
setting [20]. Furthermore, we also show how to construct a hierarchical key as-
signment scheme which is secure against strong key recovery, starting from any
scheme which guarantees security against key recovery.
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we review the definition
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of hierarchical key assignment schemes; in Section 2.3 we describe all security
definitions for hierarchical key assignment schemes; in Section 2.4 we analyze the
relations among these definitions and in particular we show that security with
respect to strong key indistinguishability is not stronger than the one with respect
to key indistinguishability; finally in Section 2.5, we show how to construct a
hierarchical key assignment scheme secure against strong key recovery, starting
from any hierarchical key assignment scheme which is secure against key recovery.
2.2 Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes
Consider a set of users divided into a number of disjoint classes, called security
classes. A security class can represent a person, a department or a user group
in an organization. A binary relation  that partially orders the set of classes
V is defined in accordance with authority, position or power of each class in V .
The poset (V,) is called a partially ordered hierarchy. For any two classes u
and v, the notation u  v is used to indicate that the users in v can access u’s
data. Clearly, since v can access its own data, it holds that v  v, for any v ∈ V .
We denote the accessible set of a class v by Av, which corresponds to the set
{u ∈ V : u  v}, for any v ∈ V . The partially ordered hierarchy (V,) can be
represented by the directed graph G∗ = (V,E∗), where each class corresponds to
a vertex in the graph and there is an edge from class v to class u if and only if
u  v. We denote by G = (V,E) the minimal representation of the graph G∗,
namely, the directed acyclic graph corresponding to the transitive and reflexive
reduction of the graph G∗ = (V,E∗). The graph G has the same transitive and
reflexive closure of G∗, i.e., there is a path (of length greater than or equal to zero)
from v to u in G if and only if there is the edge (v, u) in E∗. Aho et al. [1] showed
that every directed graph has a transitive reduction, which can be computed in
polynomial time and is unique for directed acyclic graphs. In the following, we
denote by Γ a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies.
For example, Γ could be the family of the rooted trees [64], the family of the
d-dimensional hierarchies [5], etc..
A hierarchical key assignment scheme for a family Γ of graphs, corresponding to
partially ordered hierarchies, is defined as follows in [8, 32, 37, 38, 29, 30, 33, 7].
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Definition 2.2.1. A hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ is a pair
(Gen,Der) of algorithms satisfying the following conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen is probabilistic polynomial-time.
It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ and a graph G = (V,E) in Γ,
and produces as outputs
(a) a private information su, for any class u ∈ V ;
(b) a key ku ∈ {0, 1}τ , for any class u ∈ V ;
(c) a public information pub.
We denote by (s, k, pub) the output of the algorithm Gen on inputs 1τ and
G, where s and k denote the sequences of private information and keys,
respectively.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der is deterministic polynomial-time. It takes
as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a graph G = (V,E) in Γ, two classes
u, v in V , the private information su assigned to class u and the public
information pub, and produces as output the key kv ∈ {0, 1}τ assigned to
class v if v ∈ Au, or a special rejection symbol ⊥ otherwise.
We require that for each class u ∈ V , each class v ∈ Au, each private
information su, each key kv ∈ {0, 1}τ , each public information pub which
can be computed by Gen on inputs 1τ and G, it holds that
Der(1τ , G, u, v, su, pub) = kv.
2.3 Notions of Security
A hierarchical key assignment scheme must be resistant to collusive attacks. More
precisely, for each class u ∈ V , the key ku should be protected against a coalition
of all users in the set Fu = {v ∈ V : u 6∈ Av}, corresponding to the ones which
are not allowed to compute the key ku.
Atallah et al. [4] first introduced two different security goals for hierarchi-
cal key assignment schemes: security with respect to key-indistinguishability and
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security against key recovery. The former formalizes the requirement that the
adversary is not able to learn any information (even a single bit) about a key ku
which it should not have access to, i.e., it is not able to distinguish it from a ran-
dom string having the same length. On the other hand, the latter corresponds to
the weaker requirement that an adversary is not able to compute a key ku which
it should not have access to. The notion of key indistinguishability offers security
guarantees that cannot be achieved by schemes whose security relies only upon
key recovery. These stronger security guarantees could be necessary. For exam-
ple, as pointed out in [33], it is straightforward that the key indistinguishability
notion is needed when the data associated to a class are protected by means of
a symmetric encryption scheme, whose implementation details make the confi-
dentiality of the ciphertext (or of part of it) depending on the secrecy of only a
portion of the encryption key.
Recently, Freire et al. [42] proposed a new security definition for hierarchical
key assignment schemes. Such a definition, called security with respect to strong
key-indistinguishability, formalizes the requirement that the adversary is not able
to learn any information about a key ku which it should not have access to, even
if it has the additional capability of gaining access to the keys associated to all
other classes which are predecessors of the target class in the hierarchy. Notice
that these encryption keys might leak through usage and their compromise could
not directly lead to a compromise of the private information su or the encryption
key ku of the target class u. Freire et al. also introduced the definition of security
against strong key recovery. Such a definition formalizes the requirement that
the adversary is not able to compute a key ku which it should not have access
to, even if it has the additional capability of gaining access to encryption keys
assigned to all the other classes which are predecessors of the target class in the
hierarchy.
In the following, we consider a static adversary which, given a class u, is
allowed to gain the private information assigned to all users not allowed to access
such class, as well as all the relative public information. For the case of strong
key indistinguishability and strong key recovery, such an adversary is also able
to access keys assigned to all other classes which are predecessors of the target
class in the hierarchy. A different kind of adversary, the adaptive one, could
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be also considered. In detail, such an adversary is first allowed to access all
public information as well as all private information of a number of classes of
its choice; afterwards, it chooses the class u it wants to attack. In [8, 7] it has
been proven that security with respect to adaptive adversaries is (polynomially)
equivalent to the one against static ones. In particular, the scenario considered
in [8, 7, 9] is more general, since the lifetime of each key is limited to a given
period of time. In such a setting, each class is assigned to a different key for
each different period of time. These schemes are called Time-Bound Hierarchical
Key Assignment Schemes. However, the equivalence between adaptive and static
adversaries shown in [8, 7] also applies to hierarchical key assignment schemes,
since they can be seen as time-bound hierarchical key assignment schemes with
a single period of time. Therefore, in this thesis we will only consider static
adversaries.
2.3.1 Security with respect to Key Indistinguishability
Consider a static adversary STATu that wants to attack a class u ∈ V and which
is able to corrupt all users in Fu. We define an algorithm Corruptu, which on
input the private information s generated by the algorithm Gen, extracts the
secret values sv associated to all classes v ∈ Fu. We denote by corru the sequence
output by Corruptu(s). Two experiments are considered. In the first one, the
adversary is given the key ku, whereas, in the second one, it is given a random
string ρ having the same length as ku. It is the adversary’s job to determine
whether the received challenge corresponds to ku or to a random string. We
require that the adversary will succeed with probability only negligibly different
from 1/2.
Definition 2.3.1. [IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to par-
tially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) be a graph in Γ, let (Gen,Der) be a
hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ and let STATu be a static adversary
which attacks a class u. Consider the following two experiments:
20
2. Notions of Security
Experiment ExpIND−1STATu (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)




(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
ρ← {0, 1}τ
d← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru, ρ)
return d
The advantage of STATu is defined as
AdvINDSTATu(1
τ , G) = |Pr[ExpIND−1STATu (1τ , G) = 1]
− Pr[ExpIND−0STATu (1τ , G) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-ST if, for each graph G =
(V,E) in Γ and each u ∈ V , the function AdvINDSTATu(1τ , G) is negligible, for each
static adversary STATu whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
2.3.2 Security with respect to Key Recovery
Now consider the case where there is a static adversary STATu which wants to
compute the key assigned to a class u ∈ V . As done before, we denote by corru
the sequence output by the algorithm Corruptu, on input the private information
s generated by the algorithm Gen. The adversary, on input all public information
generated by the algorithm Gen, as well as the private information corru, outputs
a string k′u and succeeds if k
′
u = ku. We require that the adversary will succeed
with probability only negligibly different from 1/2τ .
Definition 2.3.2. [REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to par-
tially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) be a graph in Γ, let (Gen,Der) be a
hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ and let STATu be a static adversary
which attacks a class u. Consider the following experiment:
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Experiment ExpRECSTATu(1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
k′u ← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru)
return k′u
The advantage of STATu is defined as
AdvRECSTATu(1
τ , G) = Pr[ExpRECSTATu(1
τ , G) = ku].
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of REC-ST if, for each graph G =
(V,E) in Γ and each class u ∈ V , the function AdvRECSTATu(1τ , G) is negligible, for
each static adversary STATu whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
2.3.3 Security with respect to Strong Key Indistinguisha-
bility
Consider a static adversary STATu that wants to attack a class u ∈ V . Such
adversary is able to corrupt all users in Fu and to gain access to the keys associated
to all classes in the set Pu = {v ∈ V \ {u} : u ∈ Av} of the predecessors of class
u. As done before, we denote by corru the sequence output by the algorithm
Corruptu, on input the private information s generated by the algorithm Gen.
Moreover, we define an algorithm Keysu, which on input the encryption keys k
generated by the algorithm Gen, extracts keys kv associated to all classes v ∈ Pu.
We denote by keysu the sequence output by Keysu(k). Two experiments are
considered. In the first one, the adversary is given the key ku, whereas, in the
second one, it is given a random string ρ having the same length as ku. It is the
adversary’s job to determine whether the received challenge corresponds to ku or
to a random string. We require that the adversary will succeed with probability
only negligibly different from 1/2.
Definition 2.3.3. [STRONG-IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding
to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) be a graph in Γ, let (Gen,Der) be
a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ and let STATu be a static adversary
which attacks a class u. Consider the following two experiments:
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Experiment ExpSTRONG−IND−1STATu (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
keysu ← Keysu(k)








d← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru, keysu, ρ)
return d
The advantage of STATu is defined as
AdvSTRONG−INDSTATu (1
τ , G) = |Pr[ExpSTRONG−IND−1STATu (1τ , G) = 1]
− Pr[ExpSTRONG−IND−0STATu (1τ , G) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST if, for each graph
G = (V,E) in Γ and each u ∈ V , the function AdvSTRONG−INDSTATu (1τ , G) is negligible,
for each static adversary STATu whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
2.3.4 Security against Strong Key Recovery
Finally, consider the case where there is a static adversary STATu that wants to
compute the key assigned to a class u ∈ V . Such adversary is able to corrupt
all users in Fu and gain access to the keys associated to all classes in the set
Pu of the predecessors of u. As done before, we denote by corru the sequence
output by the algorithm Corruptu, on input the private information s generated
by the algorithm Gen. Moreover, we denote by keysu the sequence output by
Keysu(k). The adversary, on input all public information generated by the
algorithm Gen, as well as the private information corru and the sequence keysu,
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outputs a string k′u and succeeds if k
′
u = ku. We require that the adversary will
succeed with probability only negligibly different from 1/2τ .
Definition 2.3.4. [STRONG-REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding
to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) be a graph in Γ, let (Gen,Der) be
a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ and let STATu be a static adversary
which attacks a class u. Consider the following experiment:
Experiment ExpSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
keysu ← Keysu(k)
k′u ← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru, keysu)
return k′u
The advantage of STATu is defined as
AdvSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G) = Pr[ExpSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G) = ku].
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST if, for each
graph G = (V,E) in Γ and each class u ∈ V , the function AdvSTRONG−RECSTATu (1τ , G)
is negligible, for each static adversary STATu whose time complexity is polynomial
in τ .
2.4 Implications and Separations
In this section, we analyze the relations between the security definitions described
in Section 2.3. In particular, we show implications and separations occurring
between such notions. Figure 2.1 summarizes our results.
It is easy to see that any adversary which breaks the security of the key as-
signment scheme in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST can be easily turned into another
adversary which breaks the security of the key assignment scheme in the sense of
STRONG-IND-ST. Hence, the next result holds.
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Figure 2.1: Relations between the security notions for hierarchical key assignment
schemes.
Theorem 2.4.1. [STRONG-IND-ST⇒STRONG-REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs
corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for Γ is secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST, then it is also secure in
the sense of STRONG-REC-ST.
In the following, we show that security against strong key recovery does not
necessarily imply security with respect to strong key indistinguishability. Let
(Gen,Der) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme which is secure in the sense
of STRONG-REC-ST. We construct another scheme (Gen′, Der′) and we show that
it is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST but is not secure in the sense of
STRONG-IND-ST. Let u ∈ V be a class and let ku be the key assigned by Gen to
u. Algorithm Gen′ computes the key assigned to class u as k′u = 1||ku, where the
symbol || denotes string concatenation. All other values computed by Gen′ are
exactly the same as the ones computed by Gen. Algorithm Der′ first computes
ku by using Der, then obtains k
′
u = 1||ku. Let STATu be a static adversary that
simply checks whether the first bit x0 of the challenge x, corresponding either to
the key k′u or to a random string having the same length as k
′
u, is equal to 0. If this
happens, then STATu can easily conclude that the challenge x does not correspond




negligible, it follows that (Gen′, Der′) is not secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST.
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On the other hand, (Gen′, Der′) is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST. Assume
by contradiction that (Gen′, Der′) is not secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST.
It follows that also (Gen,Der) is not secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST, thus
leading to a contradiction. For this reason, the next result holds.
Theorem 2.4.2. [STRONG-REC-ST6⇒STRONG-IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs
corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key
assignment scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST, then
there exists a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ that is secure in the sense
of STRONG-REC-ST but which is not secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST.
The relations between the definitions of security against strong key recovery
and security against key recovery have been established by Freire et al. [42]. In
particular, they showed that the two notions of security against key recovery
and against strong key recovery are separated, i.e., there exist hierarchical key
assignment schemes that are secure against key recovery but which are not secure
against strong key recovery. An example of such schemes is the one based on
pseudorandom functions, proposed by Atallah et al. [4]. Thus, the following
theorems hold.
Theorem 2.4.3. [STRONG-REC-ST⇒REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST, then it is also secure in the sense
of REC-ST.
Theorem 2.4.4. [REC-ST6⇒STRONG-REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key assign-
ment scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of REC-ST, then there exists a
hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ that is secure in the sense of REC-ST
but which is not secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST.
In detail, the above implication can be inferred from the main idea underly-
ing the separating example proposed in [42]. On the other hand, the relations
between the notions of security with respect to key indistinguishability and with
respect to strong key indistinguishability are not completely clear. As stated by
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the next theorem, it is easy to see that security with respect to strong key indis-
tinguishability implies security with respect to key indistinguishability. However,
nothing is known about the other direction.
Theorem 2.4.5. [STRONG-IND-ST⇒IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ is secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST, then it is also secure in the sense
of IND-ST.
In the following, we show that security with respect to strong key indistin-
guishability is not stronger than the one with respect to key indistinguishability,
that is to say, STRONG-IND-ST and IND-ST are equivalent.
Theorem 2.4.6. [IND-ST⇒STRONG-IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ is secure in the sense of IND-ST, then it is also secure in the sense of
STRONG-IND-ST.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a hierarchical key assignment
scheme Σ for a graph G = (V,E) in Γ, which is secure in the sense of IND-ST
but that is not secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST. Therefore, there exists a
class u ∈ V and a static adversary STATu which is able to distinguish between








the last input of STATu, which corresponds to a random value chosen in {0, 1}τ
in the first experiment and to the real key ku in the second one.
Let Pu = {v ∈ V \ {u} : u ∈ Av} be the set of predecessors of class u and let
Gu = (Pu, Eu) be the subgraph of G induced by Pu. Without loss of generality,
let (u1, . . . , um) be any topological ordering of the vertices in Pu, i.e., any linear
ordering of elements in Pu such that for each edge (ui, uj) ∈ Eu, ui precedes uj in
the ordering. It is well know that any directed acyclic graph (DAG) has at least
one topological ordering. More precisely, a directed graph G has a topological
ordering if and only if G is a DAG [54]. Notice that the sequence keysu, which is




contains exactly the keys ku1 , . . . , kum . First of all, it is easy to observe that if
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ExpSTRONG−IND−1STATu correspond to Exp
IND−0
STATu
and ExpIND−1STATu , respectively. In this case,
since STATu is able to distinguish between such experiments with non-negligible
advantage, it follows that the scheme Σ is not secure in the sense of IND-ST,
which is a contradiction.
In addition, consider the case in which m > 0. We will show how to turn the
adversary STATu into another polynomial-time adversary STAT
′
uh , where uh ∈ Pu,
which breaks the scheme Σ in the sense of IND-ST, thus leading to a contradiction.




u , . . . ,Exp
2,m+1
u of
m+1 experiments each, all defined over the same probability space, where the first




whereas, the last experiment of the latter sequence, that is Exp2,m+1u , is equal to
ExpSTRONG−IND−1STATu .




(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
keysqu ← Keysqu(k)
d← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru, keysqu, ρ)
return d
The output of the algorithm Keysqu is the sequence keys
q
u where the first q − 1
values are independently chosen at random in {0, 1}τ and, if q ≤ m, the other
m− q + 1 values correspond to the keys assigned to the classes uq, . . . , um.
On the other hand, for any q = 1, . . . ,m, experiment Exp2,qu in the second
sequence is defined as follows:
Experiment Exp2,qu (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
corru ← Corruptu(s)
keysm−q+2u ← Keysm−q+2u (k)
d← STATu(1τ , G, pub, corru, keysm−q+2u , ku)
return d
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where keysm−q+2u denotes the sequence where the first m − q + 1 values are in-
dependently chosen at random in {0, 1}τ and, if q ≥ 2, the other q − 1 values
correspond to the keys assigned to the classes um−q+2, . . . , um.
Since Exp1,1u , which corresponds to Exp
STRONG−IND−0
STATu
, and Exp2,m+1u , which cor-
responds to ExpSTRONG−IND−1STATu , can be distinguished by STATu with non-negligible
advantage, then there exists at least a pair of consecutive experiments, in the se-
quence of 2m+ 2 experiments obtained by composition of the two above defined
sequences, which are distinguishable by STATu with non-negligible advantage.
We first show that such a pair cannot consist of the two extremal experi-
ments, namely, the last experiment of the first sequence, that is Exp1,m+1u , and
the first experiment of the second sequence, that is Exp2,1u . Assume by con-





non-negligible advantage. Notice that the only difference between such two ex-
periments is the last input of STATu, which corresponds to a random value chosen
in {0, 1}τ in experiment Exp1,m+1u , and to the real key ku in experiment Exp2,1u .
We show how to construct another adversary STAT′u which breaks the security
of the scheme Σ in the sense of IND-ST, by using the adversary STATu. The ad-
versary STAT′u, on inputs 1
τ , G, the sequence of private information corru and
a final value α, corresponding either to the key ku or to a random value chosen
in {0, 1}τ , constructs the sequence keysm+1u needed for STATu choosing indepen-
dently at random m elements in {0, 1}τ . Then, STAT′u outputs the same output
as STATu(1
τ , G, pub, corru, keys
m+1
u , α). Clearly, since STATu is able to distinguish
between Exp1,m+1u and Exp
2,1
u with non-negligible advantage, then STAT
′
u is able
to distinguish between ExpIND−0STAT′u and Exp
IND−1
STAT′u with non-negligible advantage,
thus breaking the security of the scheme Σ in the sense of IND-ST. Contradiction.
Thus, the pair of consecutive experiments which can be distinguished by STATu,
belongs either to the first sequence or to the second one.
Assume that the pair of distinguishable consecutive experiments belongs to the
first sequence and it is composed by Exp1,hu and Exp
1,h+1
u , for some h = 1, . . . ,m.
Notice that the views of STATu in such two consecutive experiments differ only for
a single value, which corresponds to the key kuh in Exp
1,h
u and to a random value
chosen in {0, 1}τ in Exp1,h+1u . We show how to construct an adversary STAT′′uh
which breaks the security of the scheme Σ in the sense of IND-ST, by using
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the adversary STATu. In particular, we show that STAT
′′




The adversary STAT′′uh , on inputs 1
τ , G, the sequence of private information
corruh and a final value α, corresponding either to the key kuh or to a random
value chosen in {0, 1}τ , constructs the inputs for STATu as follows:
• First, STAT′′uh extracts from corruh the sequence corru. This can be done
since uh ∈ Pu, i.e., uh is a predecessor of u, hence classes which are corrupted
for u are also corrupted for uh and their private information is in corruh .
• Then, STAT′′uh uses corruh and α to construct a sequence keysαu , which
corresponds either to keyshu or to keys
h+1
u . In particular, the first h − 1
elements of keysαu are independently chosen at random in {0, 1}τ , the h-
th element is set equal to α, whereas, the remaining m − h ones, which
correspond to the keys of the classes uh+1, . . . , um, are computed by using
the private information of such classes, which are contained in corruh .
• Moreover, the last input for STATu is set equal to a random value ρ chosen
in {0, 1}τ .
Finally, STAT′′uh outputs the same output as STATu(1
τ , G, pub, corru, keys
α
u , ρ).









with non-negligible advantage, thus breaking the security of the
scheme Σ in the sense of IND-ST. Contradiction.
Notice that if the pair of distinguishable consecutive experiments belongs
to the second sequence, i.e., is composed by Exp2,hu and Exp
2,h+1
u , for some
h = 1, . . . ,m, the proof is similar to the previous case.
From Theorems 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 we obtain the following results.
Theorem 2.4.7. [IND-ST⇒STRONG-REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ is secure in the sense of IND-ST, then it is also secure in the sense of
STRONG-REC-ST.
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Theorem 2.4.8. [STRONG-REC-ST6⇒IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key assign-
ment scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST, then there
exists a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ that is secure in the sense of
STRONG-REC-ST but which is not secure in the sense of IND-ST.
The next result, which has already been proven in [7], follows from Theorems
2.4.6, 2.4.1, and 2.4.3.
Theorem 2.4.9. [IND-ST⇒REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding
to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ is
secure in the sense of IND-ST, then it is also secure in the sense of REC-ST.
On the other hand, the next result holds [7].
Theorem 2.4.10. [REC-ST6⇒IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs correspond-
ing to partially ordered hierarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of REC-ST, then there exists a hierarchi-
cal key assignment scheme for Γ that is secure in the sense of REC-ST but which
is not secure in the sense of IND-ST.
From Theorems 2.4.5, 2.4.6, and 2.4.9, we obtain the next result.
Theorem 2.4.11. [STRONG-IND-ST⇒REC-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs corre-
sponding to partially ordered hierarchies. If a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ is secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST, then it is also secure in the sense
of REC-ST.
Finally, from Theorems 2.4.5, 2.4.6, and 2.4.10, the next result holds.
Theorem 2.4.12. [REC-ST6⇒STRONG-IND-ST] Let Γ be a family of graphs cor-
responding to partially ordered hierarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key as-
signment scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of REC-ST, then there exists
a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ that is secure in the sense of REC-ST
but which is not secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST.
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2.5 Towards Security against Strong Key Re-
covery
As said in the previous section, the two notions of security against key recovery
and against strong key recovery are separated, i.e., there exist hierarchical key
assignment schemes that are secure against key recovery but which are not secure
against strong key recovery. In this section, we investigate the possibility of
obtaining a scheme which is secure with respect to the stronger notion, starting
from any scheme which is secure with respect to the weaker one.
The idea behind our construction is the following. Given a graph G = (V,E)
representing a partially ordered hierarchy, we construct another graph G′ which
represents the same hierarchy, but that has |V | additional classes. Then, we use a
hierarchical key assignment scheme to assign private information and encryption
keys to the classes of G′. This assignment can be easily turned into an assignment
for the original graph G. Indeed, the private information for each class in G is set
equal to that assigned to the same class in G′, whereas, the encryption keys for
classes in G are those assigned to the additional classes in G′. We will show how
the resulting hierarchical key assignment scheme for G satisfies security against
strong key recovery, provided that the underlying scheme for G′ satisfies security
against key recovery.
Formally, let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hier-
archies. For each graph G = (V,E) in Γ we define a graph transformation, whose
output, denoted by G′ = (V ′, E ′), is called the extended graph for G. We denote
by Γ′ the family of extended graphs for elements in Γ. The transformation works
as follows:
• For each u ∈ V , we place two classes u and u0 in V ′;
• For each class u ∈ V , we place the edge (u, u0) in E ′;
• For each (u, v) ∈ E, we place the edge (u, v) in E ′.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of the extended graph for G = (V,E), where
V = {a, b, c, d} and E = {(a, b), (a, c), (b, d), (c, d)}.
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Finally, from Theorems 4.5, 4.6, and 4.10, the next result
holds.
Theorem 4.12. [REC-ST6⇒STRONG-IND-ST] Let Γ be a
family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hi-
erarchies. If there exists a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for Γ which is secure in the sense of REC-ST,
then there exists a hierarchical key assignment scheme
for Γ that is secure in the sense of REC-ST but which is
not secure in the sense of STRONG-IND-ST.
5 TOWARDS SECURITY AGAINST
STRONG KEY RECOVERY
As said in the previous section, the two notions of security
against key recovery and against strong key recovery are sep-
arated, i.e., there exist hierarchical key assignment schemes
that are secure against key recovery but which are not secure
against strong key recovery. In this section, we investigate
the possibility of obtaining a scheme which is secure with
respect to the stronger notion, starting from any scheme
which is secure with respect to the weaker one.
The idea behind our construction is the following. Given
a graph G = (V,E) representing a partially ordered hier-
archy, we construct another graph G′ which represents the
same hierarchy, but that has |V | additional classes. Then, we
use a hierarchical key assignment scheme to assign private
information and encryption keys to the classes of G′. This
assignment can be easily turned into an assignment for the
original graph G. Indeed, the private information for each
class in G is set equal to that assigned to the same class
in G′, whereas, the encryption keys for classes in G are
those assigned to the additional classes in G′. We will show
how the resulting hierarchical key assignment scheme for G
satisfies security against strong key recovery, provided that
the underlying scheme for G′ satisfies security against key
recovery.
Formally, let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to
partially ordered hierarchies. For each graph G = (V,E) in
Γ we define a graph transformation, whose output, denoted
by G′ = (V ′, E′), is called the extended graph for G. We
denote by Γ′ the family of extended graphs for elements
in Γ. The transformation works as follows:
• For each u ∈ V , we place two classes u and u0 in V ′;
• For each class u ∈ V , we place the edge (u, u0) in E′;
• For each (u, v) ∈ E, we place the edge (u, v) in E′.
Figure 2 shows an example of the extended graph
for G = (V,E), where V = {a, b, c, d} and E =
{(a, b), (a, c), (b, d), (c, d)}.
Let Γ′ be the family of extended graphs for elements
in Γ and let (Gen′, Der′) be a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for Γ′. The proposed key assignment scheme for Γ
works as follows.
Algorithm Gen(1τ , G)
1) Construct the extended graph G′ = (V ′, E′) for G =
(V,E);






Figure 2: The graph G′ = (V ′, E′), where V = {a, b, c, d}
and E = {(a, b), (a, c), (b, d), (c, d)}.
3) For each class u ∈ V , let su = s′u;
4) For each class u ∈ V , let ku = k′u0 ;
5) Let s and k be the sequences of private information and
keys, respectively, computed in the previous steps;
6) Output (s, k, pub).
Algorithm Der(1τ , G, u, v, su, pub)
1) Let k′v0 be the output of Der
′ on inputs




2) Output kv = k′v0 .
The next theorem states that if (Gen′, Der′) is secure
against key recovery, then (Gen,Der) is secure against
strong key recovery.
Theorem 5.1. If (Gen′, Der′) is secure in the sense of
REC-ST, then (Gen,Der) is secure in the sense of
STRONG-REC-ST.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that the scheme
(Gen,Der) is not secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST.
Therefore, there exists a graph G = (V,E) in Γ and a
class u ∈ V for which there exists a polynomial time
adversary STATu whose advantage Adv
STRONG−REC
STATu
(1τ , G) is
non-negligible. We show how to construct a polynomial-
time adversary which, by using STATu, is able to break
the security of the scheme (Gen′, Der′) in the sense of
REC-ST. Such an adversary, which we denote by STAT′u0 ,
on inputs 1τ , an extended graph G′, the public information
pub′, and the sequence corr′u0 of private information held by
corrupted users, constructs the inputs for STATu as follows:
• First, STAT′u0 constructs the graph G from G
′, so
that G′ is the extended graph for G. This operation
simply involves the cancellation of all the classes
v0 ∈ V ′.
• Then, the adversary sets the public information pub
to be equal to pub′.
• Afterwards, the adversary extracts the sequence
corru from corr′u0 . Indeed, corr
′
u0 contains the pri-
vate information s′v for each class v ∈ Fu.
Figure 2.2: The graph G′ = (V ′, E ′), where V = {a, b, c, d} and E =
{(a, b), (a, c), (b, d), (c, d)}.
Let Γ′ be th family of extended graphs for elements in Γ and let (Gen′, Der′)
be a hierarchical key assignm nt scheme for Γ′. The proposed key assignment
scheme for Γ works as follows.
Algorithm Gen(1τ , G)
1. Construct the extended graph G′ = (V ′, E′) for G = (V,E);
2. Let (s′, k′, pub′) be the output of Gen′ on inputs (1τ , G′);
3. For eac class u ∈ V , let su = s′u;
4. F r each class u ∈ V , let ku = k′u0 ;
5. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys, respectively, com-
puted in the previous steps;
6. Output (s, k, pub).
Algorithm Der(1τ , G, u, v, su, pub)
1. Let k′v0 be the output of Der




2. Output kv = k
′
v0 .
The next theorem states that if (Gen′, Der′) is secure against key recovery,
th (G n,Der) is secure against strong key recovery.
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Theorem 2.5.1. If (Gen′, Der′) is secure in the sense of REC-ST, then
(Gen,Der) is secure in the sense of STRONG-REC-ST.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the scheme (Gen,Der) is not secure in the
sense of STRONG-REC-ST. Therefore, there exists a graph G = (V,E) in Γ and
a class u ∈ V for which there exists a polynomial time adversary STATu whose
advantage AdvSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G) is non-negligible. We show how to construct a
polynomial-time adversary which, by using STATu, is able to break the security
of the scheme (Gen′, Der′) in the sense of REC-ST. Such an adversary, which we
denote by STAT′u0 , on inputs 1
τ , an extended graph G′, the public information
pub′, and the sequence corr′u0 of private information held by corrupted users,
constructs the inputs for STATu as follows:
• First, STAT′u0 constructs the graph G from G′, so that G′ is the extended
graph for G. This operation simply involves the cancellation of all the
classes v0 ∈ V ′.
• Then, the adversary sets the public information pub to be equal to pub′.
• Afterwards, the adversary extracts the sequence corru from corr′u0 . Indeed,
corr′u0 contains the private information s
′
v for each class v ∈ Fu.
• Moreover, the adversary constructs the sequence keysu as follows: first,




v 6= u. Such values are then used to compute the sequence of keys k′v0 for
each v 6= u. These values are exactly the elements of the sequence keysu.
Finally, STAT′u0 returns the same output as STATu(1
τ , G, pub, corru, keysu).
Therefore, it is easy to see that
AdvRECSTAT′u0 (1
τ , G′) = AdvSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G).
Since AdvSTRONG−RECSTATu (1
τ , G) is non-negligible, it follows that the adversary STAT′u0





Access Control For Dynamic
Structures
“Each problem that I solved became a rule,
which served afterwards to solve other
problems.”
— Rene Descartes, 1596-1650
3.1 Introduction
Sometimes, it is necessary to make some dynamic updates to the hierarchy, in or-
der to implement an access control policy which evolves over time. For example,
within a hospital system, whenever a new doctor is hired, it is necessary to assign
him to a certain security class. Similarly, whenever a doctor retires, we need to
remove him from the corresponding security class. The above situations, con-
cerning single individuals, may be extended to the case where an entire security
class needs to be inserted or deleted in the hierarchy. Moreover, also the rela-
tionships between the classes could change over time. For example, in a complex
enterprise security system, an entire class of users with a different security profile
may be added as a consequence of the acquisition of a new company or branch,
or similarly, the role and mission of an entire company sector may change after a
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fusion between enterprises, resulting in the need of redefining the structure of the
access control hierarchy through the modification of several dependencies among
the existing classes.
However, all security models proposed so far consider an operational scenario
which is fixed and immutable. More precisely, the adversary is not allowed to
make any changes to the hierarchy, which is fixed and chosen at the time of the
attack. We remark that this fact represents an important limitation, since the
existing models are not able to characterize the different networking scenarios
which may arise in many operating environments.
For example, advances in wireless communication and electronics have enabled
the development of User-Centric Networks (UCNs), which can be considered as
an abstraction of the so called infrastructureless networks (e.g., AdHoc Networks,
Sensor Networks, etc.). UCNs have a lot of applications and an even wider spec-
trum of future applications is likely to follow [3]. The topology of such networks
changes very frequently, due to failures or mobility [71]. In this context, each
node represents a potential point of attack, thus making impractical to monitor
and protect each individual node from either physical or logical attacks [40]. In
particular, nodes may be susceptible to several attacks, such as capture and phys-
ical tampering. Once a node has been compromised, the adversary can physically
access to this node and extract its sensitive information. Again, a node may also
be altered or replaced, resulting in a compromised node under the control of the
adversary. Furthermore, a node may also be permanently destroyed or turned
off, so the losses are irreversible. Notice that data loss or damage can even occur
due to harsh communication environments. Finally, also the communication links
may become lost or unavailable.
As it can be easily noticed from above considerations, it is necessary to extend
and improve the existing security models, by providing the adversary with further
attack capabilities. That is, the adversary should be given the possibility of
performing a polynomial number of arbitrary changes to the hierarchy. Such
changes should emulate as closely as possible all the attacks that can be performed
in the real world, e.g., addition, deletion and modification of classes (nodes) and
relations (edges), as well as the revocation of users.
In this chapter we consider hierarchical key assignment schemes supporting
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dynamic updates. We first propose a new security model which extends those
that have been defined in the literature. In particular, we extend the notions of
security against key recovery and with respect to key indistinguishability provided
by Atallah et al., to address the further challenges introduced by the updates to
the hierarchy. In this way, we provide the adversary with the ability to emulate
all operations that can be performed in a real networking context. Moreover,
we provide the first formal definition of hierarchical key assignment schemes sup-
porting dynamic updates. Finally, we show how to construct a hierarchical key
assignment scheme supporting dynamic updates, by using as a building block a
symmetric encryption scheme. The proposed construction is provably secure with
respect to key indistinguishability, provides efficient key derivation and updating
procedures, while requiring each user to store only a single private key.
The Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we formalize the concept of
hierarchical key assignment scheme supporting dynamic updates, in particular by
focusing on the types of updates as well as on the security notions. In Section 3.3
we show how to construct a hierarchical key assignment scheme which supports
dynamic updates, by using as a building block a symmetric encryption scheme.
3.2 Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes with
Dynamic Updates
A hierarchical key assignment scheme for a family Γ of graphs, corresponding to
partially ordered hierarchies, supporting dynamic updates is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.1. A hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ supporting dy-
namic updates is a triple (Gen,Der, Upd) of algorithms satisfying the following
conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen, executed by the TA, is proba-
bilistic polynomial-time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ and a
graph G = (V,E) in Γ, and produces as outputs
(a) a private information su, for any class u ∈ V ;
(b) a key ku ∈ {0, 1}τ , for any class u ∈ V ;
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(c) a public information pub.
We denote by (s, k, pub) the output of the algorithm Gen on inputs 1τ and
G, where s and k denote the sequences of private information and of keys,
respectively.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der, executed by some authorized user, is
deterministic polynomial-time. It takes as inputs the security parameter
1τ , a graph G = (V,E) in Γ, two classes u ∈ V and v ∈ AGu , the private
information su assigned to class u and the public information pub, and
produces as output the key kv ∈ {0, 1}τ assigned to class v.
We require that for each class u ∈ V , each class v ∈ AGu , each private
information su, each key kv ∈ {0, 1}τ , each public information pub which
can be computed by Gen on inputs 1τ and G, it holds that
Der(1τ , G, u, v, su, pub) = kv.
3. The update algorithm Upd, executed by the TA, is probabilistic polynomial-
time. It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a graph G = (V,E)
in Γ, the tuple (s, k, pub) (generated either by Gen or by Upd itself), an
update type up, a sequence of additional parameters params, and produces
as outputs
(a) a updated graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) in Γ;
(b) a private information s′u, for any class u ∈ V ′;
(c) a key k′u ∈ {0, 1}τ , for any class u ∈ V ′;
(d) a public information pub′.
The sequence params, if not empty, is used to generate new keys and se-
cret information as a consequence of the update type up. We denote by
(s′, k′, pub′) the sequences of private information, keys, and public informa-
tion output by Upd(1τ , G, s, k, pub, up, params).
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In the above definition, it is required that the updated graph G′ still belongs
to the family Γ of partially ordered hierarchies, i.e., only updates which preserve
the partial order relation between the classes in the hierarchy are allowed.
3.2.1 Types of Updates
In this section we consider different types of updates which can be performed
by using the algorithm Upd and we discuss how such updates modify the access
rights of the classes in the hierarchy obtained after the update. The update types
we consider are the following: insertion of an edge, insertion of a class, deletion
of an edge, deletion of a class, key replacement, and revocation of a user from a
class. Notice that some types of updates can be seen as a sequence of other types
of updates. For example, the deletion of a class u can be performed by executing
a sequence of edge deletions, one for each edge ingoing u and outgoing from u.
On the other hand, the deletion of the edge (u, v) requires a key replacement
operation for the class v. Finally, the revocation of a user from a class u requires
a sequence of key replacement operations. In the following we describe each type
of update.
• Insertion of an edge. Let u and v be two classes in V such that (u, v) 6∈ E.
The insertion of the edge (u, v) in the graph G′ = (V ′, E ′) requires to update
the accessible set of any class which was able to access u in G, in order to
include the new access rights. In particular, for any class w such that
u ∈ AGw , the updated accessible set AG
′




w ∪ AGv .
Moreover, the insertion of the edge (u, v) in G′ also requires to update the
forbidden set of any class which was accessed by v in G, in order to remove
all classes which are able to access u. In particular, for any class z such that
z ∈ AGv , the updated forbidden set FG
′




z \ {w :
u ∈ AGw}.
• Insertion of a class. Let u 6∈ V be a class to be inserted in the graph
G′, along with new incoming and outgoing edges. Such an update can be
seen as a composition of edge insertions, considering each edge ingoing u
and outgoing from u as a separate update. Consequently, the accessible
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and forbidden sets of classes in G′ can be determined as explained for the
case of edge insertions.
• Deletion of an edge. Let u and v be two classes in V such that (u, v) ∈ E.
The deletion of the edge (u, v) from the graph G requires to check if any
class z which was able to access class u in G is still able to access class v in
the updated graph G′. More precisely, we have to investigate if there exists
another path from z to v avoiding the deleted edge (u, v). If such a path
exists, then the accessible set AG
′
z is set to be equal to A
G
z . On the other
hand, if such a path does not exist, then class v needs to be deleted from
AGz , and we continue to check whether there exists a path from z and each
class w which can be accessed by v, in order to decide whether w has to
be deleted from AGz [55, 51]. Moreover, the forbidden set of each class w
which can be accessed by class v, needs to be updated in order to include all
classes whose unique path to w has been broken by the deleted edge (u, v).
• Deletion of a class. Let u ∈ V be a class to be deleted in the graph
G, along with its incoming and outgoing edges, thus yielding to the graph
G′. This update requires to follow the above described procedure for edge
deletion. Moreover, in order to preserve the partial order relation between
the classes, such an update also requires to insert a new edge between each
predecessor and each successor of the deleted class u.
• Key replacement. Let u be a class in G whose key ku needs to be replaced,
due either to a problem of loss, misuse or after an edge or class deletion
in the hierarchy. Such an update does not change the structure of the
hierarchy, consequently no accessible or forbidden set needs to be modified.
• User revocation. Let u be a class in G, containing a certain number of
users which share the same access rights. Whenever a user in u needs to
be revoked, we need to choose a new secret information s′u, which is then
distributed to each non-revoked user in class u. This update does not alter
the composition of the accessible set AG
′
u , which is set equal to A
G
u . However,
in order to avoid the so called ex-member problem, a key replacement update
for each class v ∈ AG′u is needed.
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Notice that the first four update types result in a structural modification of
the hierarchy, whereas, the last two do not affect its structure. In particular, the
last type of update represents a modification of the access control policy.
The efficiency of a hierarchical key assignment scheme supporting dynamic
updates is evaluated mainly according to the complexity of the updates due to
dynamic changes to the hierarchy. In particular, we would like to support dynamic
changes by means of only local updates to the public information, without re-
distributing private information to the classes affected by such changes. It is
important to note that such a re-distribution cannot be avoided in the case of
user revocation from a class, which necessarily requires to re-distribute the secret
values to the non-revoked users in that class. However, it is desirable that no
other private information must be updated.
3.2.2 Security Issues
In the following we discuss the security issues for hierarchical key assignment
schemes supporting dynamic updates. According to the security reduction
paradigm introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [44], a scheme is provably-secure
under a complexity assumption if the existence of an adversary A breaking the
scheme is equivalent to the existence of an adversary B breaking the computa-
tional assumption [44]. The security notions proposed by Atallah et al. [4] and
further extended by Ateniese et al. [7] have been designed to deal with static
hierarchies.
The above definitions need to be extended in order to address the additional
security challenges introduced by the algorithm Upd used for handling dynamic
updates to the hierarchy. In order to evaluate the security of a hierarchical key
assignment scheme supporting dynamic updates, we consider a dynamic adaptive
adversary ADAPT attacking the scheme. Such an adversary can make three dif-
ferent types of operations: performing a dynamic update, corrupting a class, and
attacking a class.
Performing a Dynamic Update. The first type of operation comprises all kinds
of updates described in Section 3.2.1, i.e., insertions and deletions of classes
or edges, key replacements and user revocations. We assume the existence of
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an updating oracle U, modeling the behavior of the TA, which performs the
required updates on the hierarchy. At the beginning, the state of the updat-
ing oracle is represented by the tuple (G0, s0, k0, pub0), where (s0, k0, pub0) is
the output of algorithm Gen on inputs 1τ and the initial graph G0. For any
i ≥ 0, the (i + 1)-th adversary’s query to the updating oracle consists of a pair
(upi+1, paramsi+1), where upi+1 is an update operation on the graph Gi and
paramsi+1 is the sequence of parameters associated to the update, which the ora-
cle answers with the updated graph Gi+1, the public information pubi+1 associated
to Gi+1, and with a sequence of keys, denoted by old ki, which have been modified
as a consequence of the update, according to the specification of the algorithm
Upd. More precisely, the updating oracle U(1τ ,Gi,si,ki,pubi)(·, ·), given the query
(upi+1, paramsi+1), runs algorithm Upd(1τ , Gi, si, ki, pubi, upi+1, paramsi+1) and
returns Gi+1, pubi+1, and old ki to the adversary, where old ki is a subsequence
of ki. Thus, U(1τ ,Gi,si,ki,pubi)(up
i+1, paramsi+1) behaves as Upd(1τ , Gi, si, ki, pubi,
upi+1, paramsi+1). Moreover, in order to be ready to reply to the next update
query, the oracle updates its state to be (Gi+1, si+1, ki+1, pubi+1). In the follow-
ing, for the sake of simplicity, we denote by Ui(·, ·) the oracle U(1τ ,Gi,si,ki,pubi)(·, ·).
Due to its adaptive nature, the adversary may require a polynomial number
m = poly(|V |, 1τ ) of dynamic updates, where each update is decided on the basis
of the answers obtained from the updating oracle at the previous steps.
Corrupting a Class. The second type of operation is the class corruption, which can
be performed again in an adaptive order and for a polynomial number of classes.
For any i ≥ 0, we assume the existence of a corrupting oracle Ci, which provides
the adversary with the private information held by the corrupted classes in the
graph Gi. In particular, an adversary’s query to the corrupting oracle Ci consists
of a class v in the graph Gi, which the oracle answers with the private information
held by class v in all graphs G0, G1, . . . , Gi (if v belongs to them). More precisely,
on input a class v in Gi, the corrupting oracle Ci(s0,s1,...,si)(·) returns the private
information sjv, for any j = 0, . . . , i such that v is in the hierarchy G
j. In the
following, for the sake of simplicity, we denote by Ci(·) the oracle Ci(s0,s1,...,si)(·).
Attacking a Class. The third type of operation is the class attack, where the
adversary chooses an update index t and a class u in the hierarchy Gt and is
challenged either in computing the key ktu or in distinguishing k
t
u from a random
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string in {0, 1}τ , depending on the security requirement.
In particular, we consider an adversary ADAPT = (ADAPT1, ADAPT2) running
in two stages. In advance of the adversary’s execution, the algorithm Gen is
run on inputs 1τ and G and outputs the tuple (s, k, pub), which is kept hidden
from the adversary, with the exception of the public information pub. During the
first stage, the adversary ADAPT1 is given access to both updating and corrupting
oracles for a polynomial number m of times. The responses obtained by the
oracles are saved in some state information denoted as history. In particular,
history contains the following information: 1) all graphs G0, G1, . . . , Gm; 2) the
sequence of updating operations up1, . . . , upm queried to the updating oracle; 3)
the corresponding sequences of public information pub0, pub1, . . . , pubm; 4) the
corresponding sequences of keys old k0, . . . , old km−1, which have been modified
according to each update; 5) the private information held by all corrupted classes.
After interacting with the updating and corrupting oracles, the adversary chooses
an update index t and a class u in Gt, among all the classes in Gt which cannot be
accessed by the corrupted classes. In particular, the chosen class u is such that,
for any class v already queried to the corrupting oracle Ci(·) and any i = 0, . . . ,m,
v cannot access u in the hierarchy Gi. In the second stage, the adversary ADAPT2
is given again access to the corrupting oracle and is then challenged either in
computing the key ktu assigned to u or in distinguishing k
t
u from a random string
ρ ∈ {0, 1}τ . Clearly, it is required that the key ktu on which the adversary will
be challenged is not included in the sequence old kt−1 of keys which have been
updated in the graph Gt.
Security with respect to Key Indistinguishability. The next definition formalizes
the key indistinguishability requirement for hierarchical key assignment schemes
supporting dynamic updates.
Definition 3.2.2. [IND-DYN-AD] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding
to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) ∈ Γ be a graph, and let
(Gen,Der, Upd) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ supporting dy-
namic updates. Let m = poly(|V |, 1τ ) and let ADAPT = (ADAPT1, ADAPT2) be a dy-
namic adaptive adversary that during the first stage of the attack is given access
both to the updating oracle Ui(·, ·) and the corrupting oracle Ci(·), for i = 1, . . . ,m,
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and during the second stage of the attack is given access only to the corrupting
oracle. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
(t, u, history)← ADAPT U
i(·,·),Ci(·)
1 (1








(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
(t, u, history)← ADAPT U
i(·,·),Ci(·)
1 (1





τ , t, u, history, ρ)
return d
It is required that the class u output by ADAPT1 is such that v cannot access u
in the graph Gi, for any class v already queried to the corrupting oracle Ci(·).
Moreover, it is also required that ADAPT2 never queries the corrupting oracle C
i(·)
on a class v such that v can access u in the graph Gt. The advantage of ADAPT is
defined as
AdvIND−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G) = |Pr[ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT (1τ , G) = 1]
− Pr[ExpIND−DYN−0ADAPT (1τ , G) = 1]|
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-DYN-AD if for each graph
G = (V,E) in Γ, the function AdvIND−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G) is negligible, for each adaptive
adversary ADAPT whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
Notice that if the adversary ADAPT1 never queries the updating oracle during
the first stage of the attack, the above definition reduces to that of security with
respect to key indistinguishability against adaptive adversaries for hierarchical
key assignment schemes with static hierarchies, referred to as IND-AD in [7]. For
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such kind of schemes, it has been proven that adaptive adversaries are polynomialy
equivalent to static adversaries, i.e., such that the class to be attacked is chosen
in advance to the execution of the scheme.
Security against Key Recovery. Now, we consider the weaker requirement of security
against key recovery. As done before, we assume the existence of the oracles Ui
and Ci. We require that the adversary will guess the key ktu with probability only
negligibly different from 1/2τ .
Definition 3.2.3. [REC-DYN-AD] Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding
to partially ordered hierarchies, let G = (V,E) ∈ Γ be a graph and let
(Gen,Der, Upd) be a hierarchical key assignment scheme for Γ supporting dy-
namic updates. Let m = poly(|V |, 1τ ) and let ADAPT = (ADAPT1, ADAPT2) be a dy-
namic adaptive adversary that during the first stage of the attack is given access
both to the updating oracle Ui(·, ·) and the corrupting oracle Ci(·), for i = 1, . . . ,m,
and during the second stage of the attack is given access only to the corrupting
oracle. Consider the following experiment:
Experiment ExpREC−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
(t, u, history)← ADAPT U
i(·,·),Ci(·)
1 (1




τ , t, u, history)
return kt,∗u
It is required that the class u output by ADAPT1 is such that v cannot access u
in the graph Gi, for any class v already queried to the corrupting oracle Ci(·).
Moreover, it is also required that ADAPT2 never queries the corrupting oracle C
i(·)
on a class v such that v can access u in the graph Gt. The advantage of ADAPT is
defined as
AdvREC−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G) = Pr[kt,∗u = k
t
u].
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of REC-DYN-AD if, for each graph
G = (V,E) in Γ, the function AdvREC−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G) is negligible, for each adaptive
adversary ADAPT whose time complexity is polynomial in τ .
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If the adversary ADAPT1 never queries the updating oracle during the first stage
of the attack, the above definition reduces to that of security against key recovery
in presence of adaptive adversaries for hierarchical key assignment schemes with
static hierarchies, referred to as REC-AD in [7].
3.3 A Construction based on Symmetric En-
cryption Schemes
In this section we consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical key assign-
ment scheme supporting dynamic updates using as a building block a symmetric
encryption scheme. In particular, we consider the Two-Level Encryption-Based
Construction (TLEBC) proposed in [7]. Such a construction belongs to the class
of time-bound hierarchical key assignment schemes, since the key derivation de-
pends not only on the relations between the classes, but also on time constraints.
However, since in this thesis we are not interested in time-bound schemes, we
describe a simplified version of the scheme, without time constraints. Later on,
we prove that the security property of the TLEBC depends on the security prop-
erty of the underlying encryption scheme. We need to recall the definition of a
symmetric encryption scheme and its notions of security.
3.3.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes
We first recall the definition of a symmetric encryption scheme.
Definition 3.3.1. A symmetric encryption scheme is a triple Π = (K,E,D) of
algorithms satisfying the following conditions:
1. The key-generation algorithm K is probabilistic polynomial-time. It takes
as input the security parameter 1τ and produces as output a string key.
2. The encryption algorithm E is probabilistic polynomial-time. It takes as
inputs 1τ , a string key produced by K(1τ ), and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
produces as output the ciphertext y.
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3. The decryption algorithm D is deterministic polynomial-time. It takes as
inputs 1τ , a string key produced by K(1τ ), and a ciphertext y, and produces
as output a message m.
We require that for any string key which can be output by K(1τ ), for any message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all y that can be output by E(1τ , key,m), we have that
D(1τ , key, y) = m.
Now, we define what we mean by a secure symmetric encryption scheme. We
consider security with respect to plaintext indistinguishability, which is an adap-
tion of the notion of polynomial security as given in [44]. We imagine an adversary
A = (A1, A2) running in two stages. In advance of the adversary’s execution, a
random key key is chosen and kept hidden from the adversary. During the first
stage, the adversary A1 outputs a triple (x0, x1, state), where x0 and x1 are two
messages of the same length, and state is some state information which could
be useful later. One message between x0 and x1 is chosen at random and en-
crypted to give the challenge ciphertext y. In the second stage, the adversary A2
is given y and state and has to determine whether y is the encryption of x0 or
x1. Informally speaking, the encryption scheme is said to be secure with respect
to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack, denoted by IND-P1-C0 in [53], if ev-
ery polynomial-time adversary A, which has access to the encryption oracle only
during the first stage of the attack and never has access to the decryption oracle,
succeeds in determining whether y is the encryption of x0 or x1 with probability
only negligibly different from 1/2.
Definition 3.3.2. [IND-P1-C0] Let Π = (K,E,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme and let τ be a security parameter. Let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary that
has access to the encryption oracle only during the first stage of the attack and
never has access to the decryption oracle. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−P1−C0−1Π,A (1
τ ) Experiment ExpIND−P1−C0−0Π,A (1
τ )
key ← K(1τ ) key ← K(1τ )





d← A2(1τ , y, state) d← A2(1τ , y, state)
return d return d
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The advantage of A is defined as
AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1
τ ) = |Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−1Π,A (1τ ) = 1]
− Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−0Π,A (1τ ) = 1]|
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0 if the advantage func-
tion AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1
τ ) is negligible, for any adversary A whose time complexity is
polynomial in τ .
The XOR Construction for Symmetric Encryption Schemes. In order to
construct an encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0 we could use a
pseudorandom function family, an important cryptographic primitive originally
defined by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [43]. Loosely speaking, a distri-
bution of functions is pseudorandom if it satisfies the following requirements: 1)
It is easy to sample a function according to the distribution and to evaluate it
at a given point; 2) It is hard to tell apart a function sampled according to the
distribution from a uniformly distributed function, given access to the function as
a block-box. A first construction, based on pseudorandom generators, was pro-
posed in [43]. It is well known that pseudorandom generators can be constructed
from one-way functions [18] [47]. The two most efficient constructions were pro-
posed by Naor and Reingold [62]. In particular, they showed a first construction,
based on the hardness of factoring Blum integers, and a second one, based on the
decisional version of the Diffie-Hellman assumption. In their constructions, the
cost of evaluating such functions is comparable to two modular exponentiations.
Consider the following construction, called the XOR construction [11], of a
symmetric encryption scheme ΠXOR,F = (KXOR,EXOR,DXOR) which is based on
a pseudorandom function family F : {0, 1}τ × {0, 1}τ → {0, 1}τ :
• The key generation algorithm KXOR outputs a random τ -bit key ρ for the
pseudorandom function family F, thus specifying a function Fρ of the family.
• The encryption algorithm EXOR considers the message x to be encrypted
as a sequence of τ -bits blocks x = x1 · · ·xn (padding is done on the last
block, if necessary), chooses a random string r of τ bits and computes, for
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i = 1, . . . , n the value yi = Fρ(r + i) ⊕ xi. The ciphertext is r||y1 · · · yn,
where || denotes string concatenation.
• The decryption algorithm DXOR, on input a ciphertext z, parses it as
r||y1 · · · yn and computes, for i = 1, . . . , n the value xi = Fρ(r + i) ⊕ yi.
The corresponding plaintext is x = x1 · · ·xn.
The encryption scheme ΠXOR,F has been shown to be secure in the sense of
IND-P1-C0 (see [11, 53]), assuming that F is a pseudorandom function family. An
efficient implementation of such a scheme could be obtained by using the HMAC
[10] to realize the pseudorandom function family F.
3.3.2 The Two-Levels Encryption-Based Construction
(TLEBC)
The construction we are going to describe uses a graph transformation, starting
from the graph G = (V,E). The output of such a transformation is a two-levels
graph GTL = (VTL, ETL), where VTL = V
` ∪ V r and V ` ∩ V r = ∅, constructed as
follows:
• for each class u ∈ V , we place two classes u` and ur in VTL, where u` ∈ V `
and ur ∈ V r;
• for each class u ∈ V , we place the edge (u`, ur) in ETL;
• for each pair of classes u and v connected by a path in G, we place the edge
(u`, vr) in ETL.
Thus, we consider a two-level partially ordered hierarchy, where each level
contains the same number of classes and there are no edges between classes at
the same level. We remark that this is not a restriction, since any directed graph
representing an access control policy can be transformed into a two-level partially
ordered hierarchy having the above features, using a technique proposed in [34].
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the graph transformation described above.
Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierarchies, let







Figure 3.1: The graph transformation used in our construction.
Two-Levels Encryption-Based Construction (TLEBC) works as explained in the
following.
Algorithm 1
1: procedure Gen(1τ , G)
2: Transform the graph G into the two-levels graph GTL = (VTL, ETL)
3: for all classes u` ∈ V ` do
4: su ← K(1τ )
5: end for
6: for all classes ur ∈ V r do
7: ku ← {0, 1}τ
8: end for
. Let s and k be the sequences of private information and keys computed
above
9: for any pair of classes u` ∈ V ` and vr ∈ V r such that (u`, vr) ∈ ETL do
10: p(u,v) ← Esu(kv)
11: end for
. Let pub be the sequence of public information computed above
12: return (s, k, pub)
13: end procedure
Before describing the algorithm Upd we recall that the update types we con-
sider are the following: key replacement, insertion of an edge, deletion of an edge,
insertion of a class, deletion of a class, and revocation of a user from a class.
Each update type requires a different procedure. Notice that some updates do
not require the sequence of additional parameters params, whereas, for other
updates, such a sequence might be not empty. In particular, the insertion of an




1: procedure Der(1τ , G, u, v, su, pub)
2: Extract the public value p(u,v) from pub
3: kv ← Dsu(p(u,v))
4: return kv
5: end procedure
do not involve the choice of fresh private information or keys.
As we will see, no update, with the exception of user revocation, requires re-
distribution of the secret information to classes. Thus, in the TLEBC, dynamic
changes to the hierarchy can be accomplished by means of only local updates to
the public information only.
Algorithm 3
1: procedure Upd(1τ , G, s, k, pub, up, params)
2: Transform G in the two-levels graph GTL = (VTL, ETL)
3: if up == Replace(kv) then
4: replace key(1τ , G, s, k, pub, kv, params)
5: else if up == Insert edge((u, v)) then
6: insert edge(1τ , G, s, k, pub, (u, v))
7: else if up == Delete edge((u, v)) then
8: delete edge(1τ , G, s, k, pub, (u, v), params)
9: else if up == Insert class(v) then
10: insert class(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v, params)
11: else if up == Delete class(v) then
12: delete class(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v)
13: else if up == Revoke(v, λ) then
14: revoke user(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v, λ, params)
15: end if
16: return (G′, s′, k′, pub′)
17: end procedure
3.3.2.1 Analysis of the Scheme
In the following we show that the security property of the TLEBC depends on
the security property of the underlying encryption scheme. We prove that if the




1: procedure replace key(1τ , G, s, k, pub, kv, params)
2: if params is not empty then
3: Parse params as kparamsv
4: k′v ← kparamsv
5: else
6: k′v ← {0, 1}τ
7: end if
8: s′ ← s
9: k′ ← k, with k′v instead of kv
10: for all classes u` ∈ V ` such that (u`, vr) ∈ ETL do




1: procedure insert edge(1τ , G, s, k, pub, (u, v))
2: k′ ← k
3: s′ ← s;
4: Compute p′(u,v) ← Es′u(k′v) and add it to pub, obtaining pub′
5: end procedure
Algorithm 6
1: procedure delete edge(1τ , G, s, k, pub, (u, v), params)
2: replace key(1τ , G, s, k, pub, kv, params)






1: procedure insert class(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v, params)
2: if params is not empty then
3: Parse params as sparamsv and k
params
v
4: s′v ← sparamsv
5: k′v ← kparamsv
6: else
7: s′v ← K(1τ )
8: k′v ← {0, 1}τ
9: end if
10: Add above values into s and k, obtaining s′ and k′
11: Compute p′(v,v) ← Es′v(k′v)
12: Use aforementioned procedure for adding incoming and outgoing edges
from v
13: Add all the public values to pub, obtaining pub′
14: end procedure
Algorithm 8
1: procedure delete class(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v)
2: Use aforementioned procedure for deleting incoming and outgoing edges
from v




1: procedure revoke user(1τ , G, s, k, pub, v, λ, params)
2: if params is not empty then
3: parse params as sparamsv
4: s′v ← sparamsv
5: else
6: s′v ← K(1τ )
7: end if
8: Distribute s′v to each non-revoked user in the class v
9: s′ ← s, with s′v instead of sv
10: for all classes ur ∈ V r such that (v`, ur) ∈ ETL do





TLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-DYN-AD, respectively.
We first give an informal description of the ideas on which the proof is based.
The proof uses two well known techniques: black-box reductions [44] and hybrid
arguments [18]. In general, a black-box reduction is used to show that, given a
protocol constructed from a cryptographic primitive, if the protocol can be broken
somehow, then also the underlying primitive can be broken. On the other hand,
the hybrid argument technique is used to argue that two probability ensembles,
i.e., two sequences of probability distributions defined over the same probability
space, are computationally indistinguishable. In this type of proof, one defines a
sequence, constituted by a polynomial number (in the security parameter) of prob-
ability ensembles, also called the hybrids, where the extreme hybrids correspond
to the two ensembles to be shown indistinguishable. Since the total number of hy-
brids is polynomial, a non-negligible gap between the extreme hybrids translates
into a non-negligible gap between a pair of adjacent hybrids.
In our security proof, the probability ensembles are given by the view of a
dynamic adaptive adversary ADAPT which, after making a polynomial number of
updating and corrupting queries, attacks a class vr in the two-levels hierarchy
obtained after the t-th update on the initial graph G = (V,E). In particular,
such a view contains the public information pubi associated to the graph Gi, for
i = 1, . . . , t, the private information held by the corrupted classes, along with a
final value, which corresponds to the key kh assigned to the chosen class v
r after
the t-th update. The two extreme hybrids we consider are characterized in one
case by the adversary’s view when the public values are generated according to
the TLEBC, thus containing encryptions of the key kh, while in the other case by
the adversary’s view when part of the public values is generated by encrypting a
randomly chosen value ρ having the same length as kh. More precisely, the public
values which are modified in the last hybrid correspond to those associated to
the edges, say (v`1, v
r), (v`2, v
r), . . . , (v`m, v
r), entering class vr in the two-levels
hierarchy obtained after the t-th update. Thus, in the last hybrid, the public
information is completely independent on the last input of the adversary, i.e.,
kh, since the values associated to all edges entering class v
r are computed as
encryptions of a randomly chosen value ρ. We define a sequence of m+1 hybrids,
where each pair of adjacent ones, say the j-th and the (j+1)-th hybrid, differ only
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in the public value associated to a certain edge entering vr, say (v`j+1, v
r), which
is equal to the encryption of the key kh in the latter one and to the encryption
of a random value ρ, having the same length as kh, in the former one. For
each pair of adjacent hybrids we show, by means of a black-box reduction, that
the corresponding views are computationally indistinguishable by the adversary
ADAPT, otherwise we could construct an adversary A = (A1, A2) which breaks
the security of the symmetric encryption scheme Π = (K,D,E) in the sense of
IND-P1-C0.
The algorithm A1, on input 1
τ , makes queries to its encryption oracle Ekey(·)
and outputs a triple (x0, x1, state), where x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}τ and state is some state
information. One message between x0 and x1 is chosen at random and encrypted
to give the challenge ciphertext y. Then, algorithm A2 is given y and state and
has to determine whether y is the encryption of x0 or x1. More precisely, the
algorithm A, in order to exploit ADAPT’s ability in distinguishing between the
j-th and the (j + 1)-th hybrid, has first to prepare the inputs for it. Such an
information, with the exception of the value associated to the (j + 1)-th edge
entering class vr, can be easily constructed by A1 following the same lines as the
Gen and Upd algorithms in the TLEBC, with an important difference: whenever
A1 has to construct the public information associated to the first j edges entering
class vr, it computes the encryptions, with the appropriate private keys, of the
random value x0. On the other hand, the (j + 1)-th edge entering class v
r will
be assigned the value of the challenge ciphertext y, whereas, all subsequent edges
entering class vr will be encryptions of the value x1, which plays the role of the
key kh assigned to v
r.
It is important to notice that, due to the dynamic behavior of ADAPT, adversary
A has no control on the sequence of updating queries asked by ADAPT, thus,
it cannot decide in advance to which class its encryption oracle Ekey(·) will be
associated. Therefore, A makes its guess at the beginning, by randomly choosing
a class whose private information will be implicitly set equal to the unknown key,
but it might fail. Indeed, if the chosen class does not correspond to the (j+ 1)-th
one having an edge entering class vr, then A cannot continue its simulation and
needs to restart itself. On the other hand, if the simulation goes well, A outputs
the same output as ADAPT: if ADAPT states that its view corresponds to that in
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the j-th experiment, then the adversary A can be sure that the received challenge
y comes from the encryption of the message x1, otherwise by the encryption of
the message x0. Clearly, the success probability of A1 is equal to 1/q, where q
denotes the number of choices which can be made by A1, meaning that, in the
worst case, A1 will need to restart itself q times. Thus, the next result holds.
Theorem 3.3.1. If the encryption scheme Π = (K,D,E) is secure in the sense
of IND-P1-C0, then the TLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-DYN-AD.
Proof. Let Γ be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered hierar-
chies. Assume by contradiction that the TLEBC is not secure in the sense of
IND-DYN-AD. Thus, there exists a graph G = (V,E) in Γ and a dynamic adaptive
adversary ADAPT = (ADAPT1, ADAPT2) which is able to distinguish between exper-
iments ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT (1
τ , G) and ExpIND−DYN−0ADAPT (1
τ , G) with non-negligibile advan-
tage. Recall that the only difference between ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT and Exp
IND−DYN−0
ADAPT is
the last input of ADAPT, which corresponds to a real key assigned by the TLEBC
in the former experiment and to a random value chosen in {0, 1}τ in the latter.
Thus, while in ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT the public information is related to the last input of
ADAPT, in ExpIND−DYN−0ADAPT it is completely independent on such a value.
Without loss of generality, let V = {v1, . . . , vn} and let k1, . . . , kn be the keys
assigned to the classes in V r by algorithm Gen of the TLEBC. For any i ≥ 1,
denote by kn+i the i-th key which either has been created using the insert class
procedure (see Algorithm 7) or has been modified using the replace key proce-
dure (see Algorithm 4). We restrict our interest to the two above procedures,
since those corresponding to the other types of updates either do not require to
choose new keys (see Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 8) or invoke the replace key
procedure (see Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 9). Moreover, let s1, . . . , sn be
the private information assigned to the classes in V ` by algorithm Gen of the
TLEBC and, for any i ≥ 1, denote by sn+i the i-th private information which
either has been created using the insert class procedure (see Algorithm 7) or
has been modified using the revoke user procedure (see Algorithm 9). We re-
strict our interest to the two above procedures, since those corresponding to the
other types of updates do not require to choose new private information. For
example, consider the following sequence of updates on the two-levels graph in
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Figure 3.1, yielding to the graph depicted in Figure 3.2: insert class d and edge
(d, c), replace key kc, insert class e and edge (e, c), replace key k
′
c. According to
the above defined enumeration, the corresponding sequence of keys is k1 = ka,
k2 = kb, k3 = kc, k4 = kd, k5 = k
′
c, k6 = ke, and k7 = k
′′
c . On the other hand,
the corresponding sequence of private information is s1 = sa, s2 = sb, s3 = sc,
s4 = sd, and s5 = se.
aℓ bℓ cℓ dℓ eℓ
ar br cr dr er
Figure 3.2: Two-levels hierarchy obtained after a list of updates.
Let q(n, 1τ ) be the running-time of ADAPT, where q is a bivariate polynomial.
For any i = 1, . . . , q(n, 1τ ), let Si be an adversary which behaves as ADAPT1 until
the choice of the key to be attacked. If the chosen key is equal to ki, then Si
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·Pr[ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT (1τ , G) = 1|ADAPT1 chooses ki]
−Pr[ADAPT1 chooses ki]





· | Pr[ExpIND−DYN−1Si (1τ , G) = 1]




Pr[ADAPT1 chooses ki] ·AdvIND−DYNSi (1τ , G).
Since AdvIND−DYNADAPT (1
τ , G) is non-negligible, then there exists at least an index
h, where 1 ≤ h ≤ q(n, 1τ ), such that AdvIND−DYNSh (1τ , G) is non-negligible. Thus,
there exists an adversary Sh which distinguishes between Exp
IND−DYN−1
Sh
(1τ , G) and
ExpIND−DYN−0Sh (1
τ , G) with non-negligible advantage. We distinguish the following
two cases:
• Case 1: h ≥ n + 1. This case corresponds to the scenario where the key
kh chosen by the adversary either has been created using the insert class
procedure (see Algorithm 7) or has been modified using the replace key
procedure (see Algorithm 4).
• Case 2: 1 ≤ h ≤ n. This case corresponds to the scenario where the key
kh chosen by the adversary has been assigned to some class in the initial
graph G.
Analysis of Case 1. Assume that the key kh chosen by the adversary either has been
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created or has been modified by the t-th update operation, which has assigned
such a key to a certain class v in the graph Gt. Thus, attacking the key kh,
corresponds to attack the class vr in the two-levels hierarchy GTL = (VTL, ETL)
obtained after the t-th update. Assume that there are m classes which are able
to access class vr in GTL, without loss of generality, let v
`
1, . . . , v
`
m be such classes.
We construct a sequence of m+ 1 experiments
Exph,0,Exph,1, . . . ,Exph,m,
all defined over the same probability space. In each experiment we modify
the way the view of adversary Sh is computed, while maintaining the view’s
distributions indistinguishable among any two consecutive experiments. For any
j = 1, . . . ,m, experiment Exph,j is defined as follows:
Experiment Exph,j(1
τ , G)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G)
(t, v, history)← S U
i,j(·,·),Ci(·)
h (1




τ , t, v, history, kh)
return d
In experiment Exph,j we first use the algorithm Gen of the TLEBC to assign
private information and keys to the classes, as well as public information to
the edges of the two-levels hierarchy. Then, in the first stage of the attack,
the updating oracle queried by adversary Sh uses an algorithm Upd
j, which is
a modification of the algorithm Upd used in the TLEBC. We remark that for
this reason the updating oracle is denoted by Ui,j(·, ·) in the experiment. The
algorithm Updj differs from Upd for the way it computes the public information
associated to the first j edges, say (v`1, v
r), (v`2, v
r), . . . , (v`j, v
r), entering class vr in
the two-levels hierarchy. In particular, the public values associated to such edges
are computed as encryptions of a value ρ randomly chosen in {0, 1}τ , instead of
the encryption of the key kh assigned to v
r, whereas, the public values associated
to subsquent edges entering vr are not modified. Notice that experiment Exph,0
is the same as ExpIND−DYN−1Sh . Indeed, the public information is related to the
last input of Sh, since the values associated to all edges entering class v
r are
computed as encryptions of kh. On the other hand, experiment Exph,m is the
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Figure 3.3: Two adjacent experiments.
same as ExpIND−DYN−0Sh . In fact, the public information is completely independent
on the last input of Sh, since the values associated to all edges entering class
vr are computed as encryptions of a random value ρ chosen in {0, 1}τ . Figure
3.3 shows two adjacent experiments in the sequence Exp7,0,Exp7,1, . . . ,Exp7,4
of five experiments obtained when attacking the key k7 in Figure 3.2.
Indistinguishability of any pair of adjacent experiments. In the following we show
that, for any j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, experiments Exph,j and Exph,j+1 cannot be
distinguished with non-negligible advantage.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a polynomial-time distinguisher
Bj which is able to distinguish between the adversary Sh’s views in experiments
Exph,j and Exph,j+1 with non-negligible advantage. Notice that the views of the
distinguisher Bj in such two experiments differ only for the public value associated
to the edge (v`j+1, v
r), which is equal to the encryption of the real key kh in the
latter experiment and to the encryption of a random value having the same length
as the real key in the former experiment. We show how to construct a polynomial-
time adversary A = (A1, A2), using adversary Bj, which breaks the security of the
encryption scheme Π = (K,E,D) in the sense of IND-P1-C0.




1. First, A1 randomly chooses an index 1 ≤ γ ≤ q(n, 1τ ), such that the pri-
vate information sγ will be implicitly set equal to the unknown key for its
encryption oracle Ekey(·).
2. Afterwards, A1 simulates algorithm Gen(1
τ , G) as follows:
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(a) If 1 ≤ γ ≤ n, it constructs the private information sβ for all β ∈
{1, . . . , n}\{γ}, as well as all encryption keys k1, . . . , kn. On the other
hand, if γ ≥ n + 1, it constructs all private information s1, . . . , sn as
well as all encryption keys k1, . . . , kn.
(b) Then, it constructs the sequence pub of public values associated to all
edges in the two-levels hierarchy obtained from G. In particular, if
1 ≤ γ ≤ n, A1 makes use of its encryption oracle Ekey(·) for all edges
outgoing class v`γ.
3. Moreover, A1 chooses at random two messages x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}τ : in particular,
x1 will play the role of the key kh, assigned to class v
r, in the next steps.
4. Then, A1 calls adversary Bj on inputs 1
τ , G and pub. In the first stage of
the attack, adversary Bj can make a polynomial number of updating and
corrupting queries. In particular, the t-th updating query of Bj consists of
a pair (upt+1, paramst+1), where upt+1 is an update operation on the graph
Gt and paramst+1 is a sequence of parameters associated to the update.
On the other hand, the t-th corrupting query consists of a class c in the
graph Gt.
(a) Each updating query can be answered by adversary A1 by means of
a simulation of a modified version of the algorithm Upd, which corre-
sponds either to Updj or to Updj+1. We recall that the algorithm Updj
differs from Upd only for the way it computes the public information
associated to the first j edges entering class vr in the two-levels hier-
archy. More precisely, the algorithm used by A1 to answer updating
queries, and in particular, to compute the public information associ-
ated to each edge (v`i , v
r), works as follows:
i. For each i = 1, . . . , j, A1 computes p
′
(vi,v)
as the encryption, with
the current private information assigned to class v`i , of the random
value x0.
ii. If v`j+1 does not correspond to the γ-th class whose private infor-
mation has been either inserted or modified, where γ is the index
chosen at step 1, then A1 restarts from the beginning; otherwise,
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it leaves to A2 the task of associating the challenge y to the edge
(v`j+1, v
r).




with the current private information assigned to class v`i , of the
value x1.
On the other hand, the public information associated to each other
edge is computed as follows:
i. For each edge (v`j+1, z
r), where z 6= v, if v`j+1 does not correspond
to the γ-th class whose private information has been either inserted
or modified, where γ is the index chosen at step 1, then A1 restarts
from the beginning; otherwise, it uses its encryption oracle Ekey(·)
to compute p′(vj+1,z) as the encryption, with the unknown key, of
the current key assigned to class zr.
ii. For each edge (w`, zr), where w` 6= v`j+1 and z 6= v, A1 computes
the public value p′(w,z) as the encryption, with the current private
information assigned to class w`, of the current key assigned to
class zr.
(b) The t-th corrupting query, corresponding to a class c in Gt can be
answered by adversary A1 with the sequence of private information held
by the corrupted class c in all graphs up to Gt, if c belongs to them.
We remark that A1 is able to respond to such a query since in step
1. it has generated the sequence of all private information s1, . . . , sn,
with the exception of sγ, corresponding to the unknown key, if 1 ≤
γ ≤ n; moreover, all subsequent private information sn+1, . . . , sq(1τ ,n)
has been generated by A1 when answering updating queries involving
class insertions or user revocations.
(c) Upon finishing its updating and corrupting queries, adversary Bj out-
puts the triple (vr, t, history−), where history− contains the following
information:
• The initial graph G along with all updated graphs G1, . . . , Gt.
• The sequence of updating operations up1, . . . , upt queried by Bj.
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• The corresponding sequences of public information obtained by
the interaction with A1 as a response for the updating queries, with
the exception of the public value associated to the edge (v`j+1, v
r).
• The corresponding sequences of keys old k0, . . . , old kt−1, which
have been modified according to each update. Notice that such se-
quences have also been obtained by the interaction with A1, which
has generated k1, . . . , kn in step 2.(a), and all subsequent keys in
response to insert class and replace key queries.
• The private information held by all corrupted classes, obtained by
the interaction with A1 as a response for the corrupting queries.
5. Finally, A1 outputs the triple (x0, x1, state), where state contains the triple
(vr, t, history−) output by Bj.
Notice that, in step 4.(a), algorithm A1 needs to restart itself from the be-
ginning in case j + 1 6= γ, where γ is the index chosen at step 1. This happens
because A1 has no control on the sequence of updating queries asked by adversary
Bj, that is, it cannot decide in advance to which class the encryption oracle Ekey(·)
will be associated. Therefore, A1 makes its guess at the beginning, by randomly
choosing an index γ ∈ {1, . . . , q(1τ , n)}, but it might fail. Clearly, the success
probability of A1 is equal to 1/q(1
τ , n), meaning that, in the worst case, A1 will
need to restart itself q(1τ , n) times.
Description of Algorithm A2(1
τ , y, state).
1. First, A2 parses state in order to obtain the sequence history
−.
2. Then, A2 adds the missing value y in the sequence history
−, associating
it to the edge (v`j+1, v
r). The updated sequence of public information is
denoted by history.
3. Afterwards, A2 calls adversary Bj on inputs 1
τ , t, vr, history, and x1.
4. Finally, A2 outputs the same output as Bj.
Notice that, if y corresponds to the encryption of x1, then the random variable
associated with the adversary’s view is exactly the same as the one associated
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with the adversary view in experiment Exph,j+1, whereas, if y corresponds to
the encryption of x0, it has the same distribution as the one associated with the
adversary’s view in experiment Exph,j. Thus, if adversary Bj is able to distinguish
between such two views with non-negligible advantage, it follows that adversary
A is able to break the security of the encryption scheme Π = (K,E,D) in the
sense of IND-P1-C0. Contradiction.
Hence, for any j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, experiments Exph,j and Exph,j+1 can-
not be distinguished with non-negligible advantage. It follows that experiments
Exph,0 and Exph,m cannot be distinguished with non-negligible advantage, for
any h = n+1, . . . , q(n, 1τ ). Therefore, no adversary Sh, for h = n+1, . . . , q(n, 1
τ ),
distinguishes between ExpIND−DYN−1Sh (1
τ , G) and ExpIND−DYN−0Sh (1
τ , G) with non-
negligible advantage.
Analysis of Case 2. As done for Case 1, we can show that no adversary Sh, where




with non-negligible advantage. The proof is similar to that for Case 1 and uses
a sequence of m+ 1 slightly different experiments
Êxph,0, Êxph,1, . . . , Êxph,m,
where m denotes the number of edges entering class vr. More precisely, let µ <
m be the number of edges entering class vr before the first updating operation;
for each j = 1, . . . , µ, experiment Êxph,j uses an algorithm Gen
j, which is a
modified version of the algorithm Gen used in the TLEBC. Such an algorithm
differs from Gen for the way it computes the public information associated to
the first j edges entering class vr in the two-levels hierarchy. On the other hand,
for each µ + 1 ≤ j ≤ m, experiment Êxph,j first uses the algorithm Genµ to
compute the public information associated to the first µ edges entering vr, then
uses the algorithm Updj, described when analyzing Case 1, in order to compute
the public information associated to edges from µ + 1 to j. As done before,
we can show that experiments Êxph,0 and Êxph,m cannot be distinguished with
non-negligible advantage, for any h = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, no adversary Sh, for
h = 1, . . . , n, distinguishes between ExpIND−DYN−1Sh (1





To conclude, we have proven that no adversary Sh, for h = 1, . . . , q(n, 1
τ ),
distinguishes between ExpIND−DYN−1Sh (1
τ , G) and ExpIND−DYN−0Sh (1
τ , G) with non-
negligible advantage. Therefore, no dynamic adaptive adversary ADAPT has non-
negligible advantage in distinguishing between experiments ExpIND−DYN−1ADAPT (1
τ , G)
and ExpIND−DYN−0ADAPT (1




Hierarchical and Shared Access
Control
“Indistinguishable things are identical (or
should be considered as identical).”
— G. W. Leibniz, 1646-1714
4.1 Introduction
Besides the conventional hierarchical access, sometimes it is necessary to provide
some particular sets of users, having specific access credentials, with access to the
key of a certain security class. This novel access control model finds a natural
field of application even when there is the need to manage unusual, exceptional or
emergency situations, which in general require special permissions. In particular,
consider the case in which the trust is based on a single entity, let it be a person or
an organization. Obviously, this may lead to abuses or violations by such entity,
as in the Snowden event [69], where a great deal of confidential information held
by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) was stolen. However, the NSA itself
has defined in the past some strict guidelines for limiting such abuses, namely,
the Orange Book [63] and Two-Person Authorization [17] [39], whose main goal
was to prevent a single user from viewing top-secret documents. The concept
upon which the guidelines are based is that, in general, somebody is less inclined
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to do something dishonest if someone else is watching. In addition, the two
guidelines clearly state that the information within a system must be organized
in a “compartmental manner”, providing different levels of access and security to
each compartment. In this case, a simple protection may be to use two or more
“locks” to protect a given resource or activity, where each lock needs a different
key, owned by a different person. Thus, two or more people are needed in order
to grant the access to that resource or activity.
The Snowden event highlights the fact that the collaboration among several
users and organizations is preferable for gaining the permission to carry out a
given task or to access sensitive information. Such collaboration is needed so as
to ensure that the requested permission has been granted through the acceptance
and agreement among all the involved entities, thus preventing users from any
kind of abuse. In general, the collaboration characterizes scenarios where more
than one entity is required to achieve a specific authorization. More precisely,
there are many real-world scenarios in which such a collaborative access is nec-
essary, i.e., where a user might have a sort of “pre-authorization” for the access,
but he may need to get the approval from someone else. For example, consider
the healthcare environment, which typically consists of several professional pro-
files, such as doctors, nurses, etc.. In this environment, nurses may access a
subset of stored patient’s clinical data, while a doctor can usually access all the
data. However, it is important to emphasize that the doctor and nurse must
have the patient’s consent to access clinical information. In addition, a nurse
should not access all the information concerning a patient, unless she does not
gain the permission from both patient and doctor. Moreover, if a doctor wants
to access some clinical data without the explicit consent of the patient, he should
be granted permission from several entities, e.g., hospital administration, medical
committee, government authority, etc..
Again, the access to the workspace of a specific project branch could be
granted either directly to the project manager or to a set of project team mem-
bers. The same arguments apply to distributed cryptographic file systems [22]. A
further real field of application lies in the collaborative access to logs concerning
accesses and events, where the access can be achieved either by a single entity
(e.g., a communications authority) or by more of them, which cooperate with
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each other. For example, the access might be allowed only if the judicial author-
ity cooperates with a given service provider. Another concrete example arises
from the military field, in which a decision can be taken by a single person with
a specific rank, by a certain number of his subordinates or more generally, by a
given number of people with certain credentials, which do not have the authority
to decide on their own. Furthermore, consider a committee board composed of
several members and a general chair. In this context, the chair might be away for
personal reasons or could be in a situation which prevents him from making any
decisions for a given action. Only one member of the board cannot independently
take such a decision on behalf of the chair. However, the board members can col-
lectively take such a decision on behalf of the chair, as long as their number is
greater than or equal to a certain threshold.
All the aforementioned considerations and examples bring to light the fact
that hierarchical and shared key assignment schemes are required in many cases.
A hierarchical and shared key assignment scheme (HSKAS) should assign an
encryption key and some private information to each class in the system in such
a way that the private information of a group of qualified users is jointly required
in order to compute the key assigned to a class lower down in the hierarchy.
In this chapter we first propose and formalize a novel access control model
which prevents the abuse of permissions, defines alternative methods for gaining
such permissions and allows the separation of duties. The model also enables col-
laboration among a set of users to gain specific permissions, defining the way in
which such collaboration takes place. Furthermore, we formalize the notion of key
indistinguishability regarding a new access model. Again, we propose two con-
structions which implement such a novel access control model. In particular, our
first proposal, denoted as the Shared Encryption Based Construction (SEBC ),
uses as its basic building blocks a symmetric encryption scheme and a perfect
secret sharing scheme, and offers security with respect to key indistinguishabil-
ity. Our second proposal, denoted as the Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based
Construction (TBEBC), is based on a public-key threshold broadcast encryption
scheme and provides security against key indistinguishability.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we formally define the
model we propose, by focusing on its specific security properties. In Section 4.3
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we provide our constructions for hierarchical and shared key assignment, along
with the relative security proofs.
4.2 The Model
There are several practical situations in which collaboration from users belonging
to different security classes is needed, in order to access sensitive data belonging
to a certain class lower down in the hierarchy. For example, a user could be part
of multiple groups at the same time, and each of them could be associated to
different access permissions. On the other hand, even the resource being accessed
may require different access policies, according to those who access it. This
problem can be solved by using a hierarchical and shared access control, where
collaboration between classes is required to make sure that the access right to
the private data held by a class v has been granted with the agreement of some
particular users.
All of these situations and usage scenarios can be modeled by means of a
directed multigraph, namely, a directed graph that can have more than one edge
between the same pair of vertices. The presence of an edge e connecting a class
u to a class v means that class u is involved in a shared access control for class
v’s data. Moreover, since each class can obviously access the resources held by
itself, the multigraph also contains “self-loops”. However, from now on, for the
sake of simplicity, we will not mention of such type of loops. Formally, a directed
multigraph is a triple G = (V,E, φ), where V is a set of vertices, E is a set of
edges, and φ is a function which associates each edge in E to its endpoints, that is:
φ : E → V × V. The edges e1 and e2 are said to be multiple or parallel if it holds
that φ(e1) = φ(e2). For example, consider the directed multigraph G = (V,E, φ)
depicted in Figure 4.1, where V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, l}, E = {e1, e2, · · · , e18}
and φ is the function defined in Table 4.1. Multiple edges are represented by
dashed lines. In general, a subgraph H = (V ′, E ′, φ′) of a multigraph G =
(V,E, φ) is a multigraph whose underlying graph is a subgraph of that of G and
its function φ′ is dominated by φ, that is, the multiplicity of an edge in H does
not exceed its multiplicity in G.
Why do we need multiple edges to model hierarchical and shared access con-
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Figure 4.1: Example of a directed multigraph characterizing our novel access
control model.
trol? The reason is that, in our new model, each class might be associated to
different access structures, corresponding to different access rights/permissions.
Given a directed multigraph G = (V,E, φ), for each class v ∈ V , let Iv ⊂ E be the
set of edges ending in v. In this chapter we consider the general situation where
more than one access structure can be associated to each class in the multigraph.
More precisely, for any v ∈ V , let mv ≥ 1 be an integer, let P1v, . . . ,Pmvv be mv
subsets of Iv, and let A
1
v, . . . ,A
mv
v be mv access structures for class v on the sets
P1v, . . . ,P
mv
v , respectively. For each v ∈ V , let Av = {A1v, . . . ,Amvv } be the family
Table 4.1: Function φ of the directed multigraph shown in Figure 4.1
e e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9
φ(e) (a, f) (b, f) (c, f) (b, g) (d, g) (g, h) (e, g) (e, h) (h, l)
e e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 e15 e16 e17 e18
φ(e) (f, i) (g, i) (g, l) (a, f) (e, f) (c, f) (d, f) (b, h) (e, h)
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of all access structures associated to class v and let A
G
= {Av}v∈V . Notice that,
if a hierarchical, but not shared, access control for a class v is required, we can
simply associate to the class v a single access structure containing all the edges
in Iv, thus requiring no collaboration among classes in order to access v’s data.
In this case, two parallel edges make no difference, since they represent the same
access right.
The proposed access model finds natural application especially in the so-called
“multi-domain environments”, namely, in all those environments in which there
are different cooperating entities, each of them with different interests, respon-
sibilities and tasks to perform. It is important to emphasize that a particular
entity, depending on the context and the role which it assumes, may have differ-
ent roles towards another given entity to which it intends to be granted access.
Informally speaking, an entity can take on several tasks, and according to the
assumed role it may have different access rights. On the other hand, a certain
security class can provide the same entity with different access rights, according
to the tasks performed by the latter in that particular context at that particular
time. Clearly, at a given time an entity may need to take simultaneously all of its
different tasks. In detail, an entity may assume one or more roles, each belonging
to the characterization of a specific access structure, for a certain security class.
4.2.1 A Motivating Example
One of the most popular examples of multi-domain environments is obviously
the one concerning healthcare. In particular, consider the multigraph shown in
Figure 4.1, let f be the security class characterizing all the data related to a
specific patient. It is easy to note that the set If is composed of seven elements,
namely, If = {e1, e2, e3, e13, e14, e15, e16}. Without loss of generality, one of the
possible characterizations for such set may be the following:
• Entityaf (Health director) = {e1, e13}, where Rolee1f = {Scientific Manager}
and Rolee13f ={Administrative Manager};
• Entitybf = {e2}, where Rolee2f = {Insurance Company};
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• Entitycf (Doctor) = {e3, e15}, where Rolee3f = {Specialist} and Rolee15f =
{Common Practitioner};
• Entitydf = {e16}, where Rolee16f = {Patient’s Family};
• Entityef = {e14}, where Rolee14f = {Administrative Office}.
Therefore, starting from the If set, the following three access structures for
the class f , that is to say, A1f={{e1, e2, e3}, {e13, e14},{e15, e16}}, A2f={{e13,
e16}, {e2, e14}, {e1, e3, e15}} and A3f={{e2, e13}, {e15, e16}, {e1, e3, e14}}, might
be characterized. For example, the first access structure, denoted as A1f , could
model the scenario in which the patient belonging to the class f is involved in
a legal dispute for insurance issues. Instead, the access structure denoted as A2f
can model the situation in which the patient intends to participate in the ex-
perimentation of a particular drug, therefore he needs to be subjected to some
specific investigations and clinical evaluations. Finally, the access structure de-
noted as A3f can model the case in which the patient finds out to have a specific
congenital disease, and for this reason needs to take out a new insurance policy
on his health, consequently canceling the old one. Obviously, the three examples
of access structure we provide for the class f , along with their relative characteri-
zations, although concrete are extremely trivial. However, as it is easy to observe,
the proposed model, because of its generality, is virtually able to represent any
set of scenarios which may potentially occur in real life.
4.2.2 Hierarchical and Shared Key Assignment Schemes
Let G = (V,E, φ) be a directed multigraph and let A
G
= {Av}v∈V be the family of
all access structures associated to the classes in V . For any X ⊆ V , we are going
to define the set of classes A
X
which can be accessed when classes in X collaborate
together. Such a set will be constructed by using a Breadth-First-Search (BFS)
on G, starting from the set X.
More precisely, starting from X, we will explore the multigraph G outgoing
from X in all possible directions, adding classes one layer at a time, according
to the access structures associated to the classes. First, notice that X ∈ A
X
,
since each class in X is authorized to access itself, with no need of cooperation.
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In particular, we denote by A0
X
= X the set of classes added at this step, also
called zero level of cooperation. Then, we start from X and include all the classes
u ∈ V for which there exists a subset Y ⊆ X such that the set E
Y
of edges whose
source classes are in Y belongs to at least one of the access structures associated
to u. This is the first layer of cooperation, and the corresponding set of classes is
denoted by A1
X
. We then include all the additional classes u ∈ V for which there
exists a subset Y ⊆ A1
X
such that the set E
Y
of edges whose source classes are in Y
belongs to at least one of the access structures associated to u. This is the second
layer of cooperation, and the corresponding set of classes is denoted by A2
X
. We
continue in this way until there are no more layers to be explored, i.e., until the set
Adiam(G)
X
has been constructed, where diam(G) denotes the diameter of G. The
set of classes A
X
which can be accessed when classes in X collaborate together is
naturally defined to be the union of the sets constructed in the different layers.
Formally, for each set of classes X ⊆ V and for each level j = 0, . . . , diam(G),
we define the set Aj
X
corresponding to the set of classes which can be accessed by






= {v ∈ V : ∃Y ⊆ Aj−1
X
s. t. EY ∈ Aiv, for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,mv}}.
The set of classes A
X
which can be accessed when classes in X collaborate together
is defined to be
A
X
= ∪diam(G)j=0 AjX .
Consider the multigraph depicted in Figure 4.1 and let A1f={{e1, e2, e3}, {e13,
e14},{e15, e16}}, A2f={{e13, e16}, {e2, e14}, {e1, e3, e15}} and A3f={{e2, e13}, {e15,
e16}, {e1, e3, e14}} be three access structures associated to class f . Moreover,
let Ag = {{e4, e5, e7}}, Ah = {{e6, e7}, {e17, e18}}, Ai = {{e10, e11}}, and Al =
{{e9, e12}} be the access structures associated to classes g, h, i, and l, respectively.
Let X = {b, c, d, e}. It is easy to see that A
X
= {b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, l}. Indeed,
A0
X
= {b, c, d, e}, A1
X
= {f, g, h}, and A2
X
= {i, l}.




Definition 4.2.1. A hierarchical and shared key assignment scheme for (G,A
G
)
is a pair (Gen,Der) of algorithms satisfying the following conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen is probabilistic polynomial-time.
It takes as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a directed multigraph G =




(a) a private information su, for any class u ∈ V ;
(b) a key ku ∈ {0, 1}τ , for any class u ∈ V ;
(c) a public information pub.
We denote by (s, k, pub) the output of the algorithm Gen on inputs 1τ , G
and A
G
, where s and k denote the sequences of private information and of
keys, respectively. Moreover, for any X ⊆ V , we denote by s
X
the sequence
of private information associated to the classes in X.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der is deterministic polynomial-time. It takes
as inputs the security parameter 1τ , a directed multigraph G = (V,E, φ) and
the corresponding set of families of access structures A
G
, a set of classes
X ⊆ V , the private information s
X
held by classes in X, a class u ∈ A
X
,
and the public information pub, and produces as output the key ku assigned
to a class u.
We require that for each class u ∈ V , each set of classes X ⊆ V , each
sequence of private information s
X
associated to classes in X, each class
u ∈ A
X
, each key ku, each public information pub which can be computed by
Gen on inputs 1τ , G and A
G




, u, pub) = ku.
4.2.3 Evaluation Criteria and Notions of Security
The efficiency of a hierarchical and shared key assignment scheme is evaluated
according to several parameters, such as the amount of secret data that needs to
be distributed to and stored by users, the amount of public data, the complexity
of key derivation, and the resistance to collusive attacks. More precisely, for each
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class u ∈ V , the key ku should be protected against any coalition of users which
are not allowed to access such class, even when pooling together their private
information.
We consider a static adversary STATu,X that wants to attack a class u ∈ V and
which is able to corrupt a set of classes X such that u 6∈ A
X
. We define an algo-
rithm Corruptu(s,X) which, starting from the private information s generated
by the algorithm Gen, and a coalition of classes X such that u 6∈ A
X
, extracts the
sequence of private information s
X
associated to the classes in X. Two experi-
ments are considered. In the first one, the adversary is given the key ku, whereas,
in the second one, it is given a random string ρ having the same length as ku.
It is the adversary’s job to determine whether the received challenge corresponds
to ku or to a random string. We require that the adversary will succeed with
probability only negligibly different from 1/2.
Definition 4.2.2. [IND-ST] Let G = (V,E, φ) be a directed multigraph and
let A
G
be the corresponding set of families of access structures, let (Gen,Der)
be a hierarchical and shared key assignment scheme, and let STATu,X be a static
adversary which attacks a class u ∈ V and corrupts a set of classes X such that
u 6∈ A
X
. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−1STATu,X
(1τ , G,AG)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G,AG)
sX ← Corruptu(s,X)




(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G,AG)
sX ← Corruptu(s,X)
ρ← {0, 1}τ
d← STATu,X (1τ , G,AG , pub, sX , ρ)
return d














The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-ST if, for each directed
multigraph G = (V,E, φ), each family of access structures A
G
, each class u ∈ V
and each set of classes X such that u 6∈ A
X




negligible, for each static adversary STATu,X whose time complexity is polynomial
in τ .
In Definition 4.2.2 we have considered a static adversary attacking a class. A
different kind of adversary, the adaptive one, could also be considered. Such an
adversary is first allowed to access all public information as well as all private
information of a number of classes of its choice; afterwards, it chooses the class it
wants to attack. However, following the lines of [7], it can be shown that security
against adaptive adversaries is (polynomially) equivalent to security against static
adversaries. Hence, in this chapter we will only consider static adversaries.
4.3 Constructions
In this section we propose two different constructions for hierarchical and shared
key assignment schemes. The former, denoted as the Shared Encryption Based
Construction (SEBC), is based on symmetric encryption and perfect secret shar-
ing schemes, whereas, the latter, denoted as the Threshold Broadcast Encryp-
tion Based Construction (TBEBC), is based on threshold broadcast encryption
schemes. Both the proposed constructions are provably secure with respect to
key indistinguishability.
4.3.1 A Construction based on Symmetric Encryption
In the following we consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical and shared
key assignment scheme by using as its basic building blocks a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme and a perfect secret sharing scheme. Before describing our construc-
tion, we first recall the definition of perfect secret sharing schemes. Instead, for
what concerns the definition of symmetric encryption schemes, the reader can
refer to the Section 3.3.1.
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4.3.1.1 Symmetric Encryption Schemes
A symmetric encryption scheme is a triple Π = (K,E,D) of algorithms satisfying
the following conditions:
1. The key-generation algorithm K is probabilistic polynomial-time. It takes
as input the security parameter 1τ and produces as output a string key.
2. The encryption algorithm E is probabilistic polynomial-time. It takes as
inputs 1τ , a string key produced by K(1τ ), and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
produces as output the ciphertext y.
3. The decryption algorithm D is deterministic polynomial-time. It takes as
inputs 1τ , a string key produced by K(1τ ), and a ciphertext y, and produces
as output a message m. We require that for any string key which can be
output by K(1τ ), for any message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all y that can be
output by E(1τ , key,m), we have that D(1τ , key, y) = m.
In the following we define what we mean by a secure symmetric encryption
scheme. We formalize security with respect to plaintext indistinguishability, which
is an adaption of the notion of polynomial security as given in [44]. We consider
an adversary A = (A1, A2) running in two stages. In advance of the adversary’s
execution, a random key (key) is chosen and kept hidden from the adversary.
During the first stage, the adversary A1 outputs a triple (x0, x1, state), where x0
and x1 are two messages of the same length, and state is some state information
which could be useful later. One message between x0 and x1 is chosen at random
and encrypted to give the challenge ciphertext y. In the second stage, the adver-
sary A2 is given y and state and has to determine whether y is the encryption
of x0 or x1. Informally, the encryption scheme is said to be secure with respect
to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack, denoted by IND-P1-C0 in [53], if ev-
ery polynomial-time adversary A, which has access to the encryption oracle only
during the first stage of the attack and has never access to the decryption oracle,
succeeds in determining whether y is the encryption of x0 or x1 with probability
only negligibly different from 1/2 (random guess).
In an adaptive chosen plaintext attack the adversary is also allowed to access
the encryption oracle during the second stage of the attack. Notice that security
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with respect to such attack has been shown to be equivalent to the one with
respect to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack in [53], thus in this chapter we
will only consider security with respect to IND-P1-C0.
Definition 4.3.1. [IND-P1-C0] Let Π = (K,E,D) be a symmetric encryption
scheme and let τ be a security parameter. Let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary which
has access to the encryption oracle only during the first stage of the attack and has
never access to the decryption oracle. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment ExpIND−P1−C0−1Π,A (1
τ ) Experiment ExpIND−P1−C0−0Π,A (1
τ )
key ← K(1τ ) key ← K(1τ )





d← A2(1τ , y, state) d← A2(1τ , y, state)
return d return d
The advantage of A is defined as
AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1
τ ) = |Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−1Π,A (1τ ) = 1]
− Pr[ExpIND−P1−C0−0Π,A (1τ ) = 1]|.
The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0 if the advantage func-
tion AdvIND−P1−C0Π,A (1
τ ) is negligible, for any adversary A whose time complexity
is polynomial in τ .
4.3.1.2 Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes
A secret sharing scheme Σ = (Share,Recover) is a pair of algorithms run by
a dealer and a set P of n participants. The Share algorithm is executed by
the dealer who, given a secret s, computes some shares s1, . . . , sn of such secret
and gives each participant one share. The shares are computed in such a way
that only qualified subsets of participants can reconstruct the value of s, by
using the Recover algorithm on input their shares, whereas, any other subset
of participants, non-qualified to know s, cannot determine anything about the
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value of the secret. Secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [65] and
Blakley [16] and have found applications in several areas of data security. Shamir
and Blakley analyzed the case in which only subsets of participants of cardinality
at least h, for a fixed integer h ≤ n, can reconstruct the secret. These schemes
are called (h, n)-threshold schemes. Subsequently, Ito et al. [52] and Benaloh and
Leichter [13] described a more general method of secret sharing. They showed
how to realize a secret sharing scheme for any access structure, where the access
structure is the family of all the subsets of participants that are able to reconstruct
the secret. The survey by Stinson [67] contains a unified description of results in
the area of secret sharing schemes.
In this chapter with a boldface capital letter, say Y, we denote a random
variable taking values on a set, denoted by the corresponding capital letter Y ,
according to some probability distribution {Pr
Y
(y)}y∈Y . The values such a ran-
dom variable can take are denoted by the corresponding lower case letter. Let
S be the set of secrets, {Pr
S
(s)}s∈S be a probability distribution on S and let a
secret sharing scheme for secrets in S be fixed. Assume for the rest of the chapter
that Pr(S = s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Let P be the set of participants, and for any
P ∈ P, let us denote by Sh(P ) the set of all possible shares given to participant
P . Given a set of participants X = {Pi1 , . . . , Pir}, where i1 < i2 < · · · < ir, let
Sh(X) = Sh(Pi1) × · · · × Sh(Pir). Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S
and a probability distribution {Pr
S
(s)}s∈S naturally induce a probability distri-




In terms of the probability distribution on the secret and on shares given to
participants, we say that a secret sharing scheme Σ = (Share,Recover) for the
access structure A is perfect if the following two conditions hold:
1. Any subset X ⊆ P of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute
the secret. Formally, ifX ∈ A, then, for all x ∈ Sh(X) with Pr(X = x) > 0,
a unique secret s ∈ S exists such that Pr(S = s|X = x) = 1.
2. Any subset X ⊆ P of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no
information about the secret. Formally, if X 6∈ A, then, for all s ∈ S and




In detail, condition 1 means that the value of the shares held by participants
in the qualified set X completely determines the secret s ∈ S. Instead, condition
2 means that the probability that the secret is equal to s given that the shares
held by participants in the non-qualified set X correspond to the sequence x, is
equal to the a priori probability that the secret is s. Therefore, no amount of
knowledge of shares of participants not qualified to reconstruct the secret enables
a Bayesian opponent to modify an a priori guess regarding which the secret is.
It is well known that, in any perfect secret sharing scheme, the size of the share
given to any participant is at least the size of the secret [21]. The sample space
of shares given to any group of participants in a perfect secret sharing scheme,
as a function of the size of the set of secrets has also been considered [19]. In
particular, the authors of [19] proved the following result, which will be useful
later.
Remark 4.3.1. Let A be an access structure on the set of participants P. In any
perfect secret sharing scheme for A for any X 6∈ A, it holds that Pr(X = x) =
1/|S|, for any x ∈ Sh(X).
Shamir’s Threshold Schemes. In the following we recall the (h, n)-threshold
scheme proposed by Shamir [65]. Let q > n be a prime number, let s ∈ Zq be the
secret to be shared among the n participants and let h ≤ n be a fixed threshold.
Let x1, . . . , xn be n distinct non-zero elements in Zq known to all the parties
(since q is a prime, then we can take xj = j). To set up the scheme, the dealer
constructs a random polynomial a(x) of degree at most h− 1, having coefficients
in Zq, in which the constant term is the secret s. The share for participant Pi is
the point (xi, yi) of the polynomial a(x).
The correctness and privacy of Shamir’s scheme derive from the Lagrange’s
interpolation theorem, which states that for any h distinct values xi1 , . . . , xih and
any h values yi1 , . . . , yih , there exists a unique polynomial a
′(x) of degree at most
h − 1 over Zq such that a′(xij) = yij , for j = 1, . . . , h. To see that Shamir’s
scheme is correct, notice that every set of participants {Pi1 , . . . , Pih} holds h
points si1 , . . . , sih of the polynomial a(x), hence each set can reconstruct it using
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Notice that a′(xi`) = si` = a(xi`), for ` = 1, . . . , h. That is to say, a
′(x) and
a(x) are polynomial of degree at most h − 1 which agree on h points, thus, by
the uniqueness in the interpolation theorem, they are equal, and, in particular,
a′(0) = a(0) = s.
In fact, they know that yij = a(xij), for 1 ≤ j ≤ h. Since a(x) has degree
at most h − 1, a(x) can be written as a(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + ah−1xh−1, where
a0, . . . , ah−1 are unknown elements in Zq and a0 = s is the secret. Thus, the
participants obtain a system of h linear equations in the h unknowns a0 . . . , ah−1.
Such a system can be represented in matrix form as Aa = y, where the coefficient
matrix A is a Vandermonde matrix, whose determinant can be computed as
det(A) =
∏
1≤j<t≤h(xih−xij) mod q. Since the xi’s are all distinct, then det(A) 6=
0 and it follows that the system has a unique solution over the field Zq. Therefore,
the h participants can reconstruct the whole polynomial a(x) and compute the
secret s = a(0).
On the other hand, any h − 1 participants have no information about the
secret s. Proceeding as above, the group of participants obtain a system of h− 1
equations in h unknowns. Suppose they hypothesize a value s′ for the secret.
Since the secret is a(0) = a0, this will yield a further equation, and the coefficient
matrix of the resulting system of h equations in h unknowns will again be a
Vandermonde matrix. As before, there will be a unique solution. Hence, for
every hypothesized value s′ of the secret, there is a unique polynomial a′(x) such
that yij = a
′(xij) for any j = 1, . . . , h − 1 and such that s′ = a′(0). Hence, no
value of the secret can be ruled out, and thus a group of h−1 participants obtain
no information about the secret.
4.3.1.3 The Shared Encryption Based Construction
In the following we consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical and shared
key assignment scheme by using as building blocks a symmetric encryption
81
4. CONSTRUCTIONS
scheme and a perfect secret sharing scheme.
Rationale behind the construction. The idea behind our construction is
similar to the one used in the EBC (Encrypted Based Construction) [33]. In the
proposed construction, each class v ∈ V is assigned a private information sv, an
encryption key kv, and a public information πv, which is the encryption of kv
using the private information sv as a key. Moreover, for each class v ∈ V and
for each edge e ∈ Iv, there is a public value pe. If no shared access control for
class v’s data is needed (recall that in this case we can consider the trivial access
structure Av = Iv), the value pe is computed as the encryption of the secret sv,
using the private information su as a key, where u and v are the endpoints of the
edge e, i.e., φ(e) = (u, v). On the other hand, if a shared access control on class
v’s data is needed, we have to consider the mv access structures A
1
v, . . . ,A
mv
v
associated to class v. The idea is to use a perfect secret sharing scheme for
each j = 1, . . . ,mv, in order to compute the shares of the private information
sv according to the access structure A
j
v on the set of edges P
j
v. More precisely,
let e ∈ Pjv such that φ(e) = (u, v), and let sj,uv be the share for the secret sv
associated to the edge e, according to the access structure Ajv. Such a share is
encrypted with the private information su as a key and corresponds to the public
value pe associated to the edge e.
Given a class v ∈ V , any set of classes X such that v ∈ A
X
can obtain a set of
shares for the secret sv, decrypting some public values. Such shares allow for the
computation of the secret sv, which can then be used to decrypt the public value
πv, in order to get the key kv. We will show that a static adversary attacking
a class u and corrupting a set of classes X such that u 6∈ A
X
, is not able to
distinguish the key ku from a random string of the same length unless it is able
to break the underlying encryption scheme.
Let G = (V,E, φ) be a directed multigraph and let AG be a family of
access structures associated to classes in V . Let Π = (K,E,D) be a sym-





v) be a perfect secret sharing scheme for the access struc-
ture Ajv. The information generation algorithm Gen of the SEBC is shown in




Algorithm 10 Gen algorithm of the Shared Encryption Based Construction.
1: procedure Gen(1τ , G,AG)
. Generation of sequences s and k
2: for each class u ∈ V do
3: su ← K(1τ ), ku ← {0, 1}τ
4: end for
. Generation of sequence pub
5: for each class u ∈ V do




7: for any j = 1, . . . ,mv do




9: for each edge e ∈ Pjv s.t. φ(e) = (u, v) do
. Let sj,uv be the corresponding share




14: for each edge e ∈ Iv, where φ(e) = (u, v) do
15: Compute the public value pe ← Esu(sv)
16: end for
17: end if
18: Compute the public value πv ← Esv(kv)
19: end for
20: end procedure
The SEBC associates a public value pe to each edge e ∈ E, as well as a public
value πu to each class u ∈ V .
4.3.1.4 Analysis of the Scheme
In this section we show that the security property of the SEBC depends on the
security properties of the underlying encryption scheme and of the perfect secret
sharing scheme.
In particular, we show that if there exists an adversary able to break the
security of the SECB in the sense of IND-ST, that is to say, which it is able to
distinguish a value assigned by the SEBC from a randomly chosen one, then such
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Algorithm 11 Der algorithm of the Shared Encryption Based Construction.
1: procedure Der(1τ , G,AG, X, sX , u, pub)
2: if u ∈ X then
3: Extract su from sX and the public value πu from pub
4: ku ← Dsu(πu)
5: else
. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ diam(G) be an index s.t. u ∈ Ai
X
6: for each ` = 1, . . . , i do
7: for each class v ∈ A`
X
do
. Let Yv ⊆ A`−1X be s.t. EYv ∈ A
j
v and 1 ≤ j ≤ mv
8: for each class w ∈ Yv do
9: Extract the public value pe from pub
. Let φ(e) = (w, v)
10: Compute the share sj,wv ← Dsw(pe)
11: end for
.On input the shares associated to edges in EYv








an adversary can be used as a “black-box” to construct an adversary which breaks
the underlying symmetric encryption scheme with respect of IND-P1-C0.
Our proof is essentially based on two well known concepts, referred to as
black-box reductions [44] and hybrid arguments [18].
Theorem 4.3.1. If the encryption scheme Π = (K,D,E) is secure in the sense
of IND-P1-C0 and Σ is a perfect secret sharing scheme, then the SEBC is secure
in the sense of IND-ST.
Proof. Let G = (V,E, φ) be a directed multigraph, let u ∈ V and let STATu,X
be a static adversary which attacks class u and corrupts a set of classes X ⊂ V
such that u 6∈ A
X
. Let Gu = (Vu, Eu, φu) be the subgraph of G induced by
the set of vertices Vu = {v ∈ V : there is a path from v to u in G} and let
Gu,X = (Vu,X , Eu,X , φu,X ) be the subgraph of Gu induced by the set of vertices
Vu,X = Vu \ X, containing the classes in Vu which have not been corrupted by
STATu,X . Without loss of generality, let (u1, . . . , um), where um ≡ u, be any
topological ordering of the vertices in Vu,X and let (e1, . . . , eh−1) be the sequence
of edges in Eu,X such that φu,X (ei) = (ua, ub) precedes φu,X (ej) = (uc, ud) if and
only if either a < c or a = c and b < d. Moreover, let φu,X (eh) = (u, u
′).
In order to prove the theorem, we need to show that the adversary’s views in
experiments ExpIND−1STATu,X and Exp
IND−0
STATu,X
are indistinguishable. Notice that the only
difference between ExpIND−1STATu,X and Exp
IND−0
STATu,X
is the last input of STATu,X , which
corresponds to the real key ku in the former experiment and to a random value
chosen in {0, 1}τ in the latter. Thus, while in ExpIND−1STATu,X the public information
is related to the last input of STATu,X , in Exp
IND−0
STATu,X
it is completely independent
on such a value. For ease of exposition, we define the following experiment:
Experiment Expu,X (1
τ , G,AG)
(s, k, pub)← Gen(1τ , G,AG)
sX ← Corruptu(s,X)
d← STATu,X (1τ , G,AG, pub, sX , αu)
return d




if αu is a random value in {0, 1}τ .
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We will show that the adversary’s view in the experiment Expu,X is indistin-
guishable from the adversary’s view in an experiment Exp∗u,X , where the public
information, at the same time, does not carry any information about the key ku
and is independent on the last input of STATu,X . More formally, the experiment
Exp∗u,X is defined as follows:
Experiment Exp∗u,X (1
τ , G,AG)
(s, k, pub∗)← Gen∗(1τ , G,AG)
sX ← Corruptu(s,X)
d← STATu,X (1τ , G,AG, pub∗, sX , αu)
return d
In the algorithm Gen∗ the public value πu associated to class u is computed as
the encryption Esu(ρ) of a random value ρ ∈ {0, 1}τ , rather than the encryption
of the key ku. Moreover, the public value associated to each edge ei, where
φu,X (ei) = (ua, ub) ∈ Eu,X is computed as the encryption Esua (ri) of a random
value ri ∈ {0, 1}τ , rather than the encryption Esua (suaub ) of the share suaub for the
private information sub . Therefore, in such an experiment, all public information
is independent on the value of the key ku. Moreover, the distributions of the
experiment Exp∗u,X when STATu,X is given as last input either the real key ku or
a random value in {0, 1}τ are the same. In such an experiment, the key ku is
just a random value independent on the public and private information in the
adversary’s view.




we only need to show that the adversary’s views in experiments Expu,X and




both indistinguishable from the same experiment Exp∗u,X , which also means that
they are indistinguishable from each other.




over the same probability space, where the first and the last experiments of the
sequence correspond to Expu,X and Exp
∗
u,X
. In each experiment, we modify
the way in which the view of STATu,X is computed, while maintaining the view’s
distributions indistinguishable among any two consecutive experiments. For any





(s, k, pubq)← Genq(1τ , G,AG)
sX ← Corruptu(s,X)
d← STATu,X (1τ , G,AG, pubq, sX , αu)
return d
The algorithm Genq used in Expqu,X differs from Gen by the way in which part
of the public information pubq is computed. For any i = 1, . . . , q − 1, the public
values associated to the edge ei such that φu,X (ei) = (ua, ub) ∈ Eu,X is computed




) of the share suaub .
In the following we show that, for any q = 1, . . . , h, the adversary’s view in the
q-th experiment is indistinguishable from the adversary’s view in the (q + 1)-th
one.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a polynomial-time distinguisher Bq,




with non-negligible advantage. Notice that such views differ
only for the way the public information associated to the edge eq, such that
φu,X (eq) = (a, b), is computed. We show how to construct a polynomial-time
adversary A = (A1, A2) that uses Bq to break the security of the encryption
scheme Π = (K,E,D) in the sense of IND-P1-C0.
In particular, algorithm A1, on input 1
τ , randomly chooses the key kv for any
class v ∈ V , as well as the private information for any class v ∈ V \ {a}.
If Ia 6= ∅, for any class v ∈ Ia, A1 considers the ma access structures
A1a, · · · ,Amaa associated to the secret sa and, for each of them, the set of edges
characterizing that access structure. Then, A1 computes the public value associ-
ated to each edge e such that φu,X (e) = (v, a) as the encryption of a random value
chosen in {0, 1}τ , using the private information sv as a secret key. Afterwards,
for any class v ∈ V \ {a} such that Iv 6= ∅, A1 considers the mv access structures
A1v, · · · ,Amvv associated to the secret sv and, for each of them, it considers the set
of edges characterizing such access structure. Subsequently, A1 uses the algorithm
Share, on input the secret information sv, to compute the sequence of shares ac-
cording to each access structure defined for the node v, which is characterized by
the relative set of edges. Such shares will be used to compute part of the public
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information. More precisely, A1 computes the public values associated to each
edge er such that φu,X (er) = (v, z) 6∈ {e1, . . . , eq} as the encryption of a random
share relative to the secret information sz by using sv as a secret key. Notice that,
in order to compute all public values associated to the outgoing edges of class
a, except for the edge eq such that φu,X (eq) = (a, b), A1 can make queries to the
encryption oracle Esa(·). Afterwards, A1 computes the public values associated
to each edge ek such that φu,X (ek) = (v, z) ∈ {e1, . . . , eq−1} as the encryption of
a random value chosen in {0, 1}τ , using as a secret key the private information
sv. Again, A1 computes the public values associated to all edges ev such that
φu,X (ev) = (v, v
′), where ev 6= eq, as the encryption of the key kv with the private
information sv. Finally, A1 sets x1 to be equal either to the key ku, if eq = eu,
where φu,X (eu) = (u, u
′), or to a random share relative to the secret sb, otherwise.
Notice that, since Σ is a perfect secret sharing scheme, by Remark 4.3.1, such
a share has the same distribution of a random value in {0, 1}τ . The sequences
s′, k and pub′ of all private information, keys, and public values constructed by
A1, along with the values x0 and x1, are saved in the state information state.
Recall that the sequence s′ contains the private information sv assigned to all
classes v ∈ V \ {a}. Similarly, the sequence pub′ contains the public information
associated to all edges in E \{eq}. Formally, the algorithm A1 is defined as shown
in Algorithm 12.
Let y be the challenge for the algorithm A, corresponding to the encryption
of either x0 or x1 with the unknown key sa. The algorithm A2, on input 1
τ , y,
and state, constructs the view for the distinguisher Bq as follows: it first extracts
from s′ the private information s
X
held by corrupted users, through the algorithm
Corruptu(s
′, X). Then, it computes the public value associated to the edge eq,
not included in pub′, in order to obtain the sequence pub. In particular, such a






, x1). More formally, A2 works as shown in Algorithm 13.
Notice that if y corresponds to the encryption of x1, then the random variable
associated to the adversary’s view is exactly the same as the one associated to the
adversary view in experiment Expqu,X , whereas, if y corresponds to the encryption
of x0, it has the same distribution as the one associated to the adversary’s view in
experiment Expq+1u,X . Therefore, if the algorithm Bq is able to distinguish between
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2: x0, ka ← {0, 1}τ
3: for each v ∈ V \ {a} do
4: sv, kv ← {0, 1}τ
5: end for
6: if Ia 6= ∅ then
7: for each v ∈ Ia do
. Consider the ma access structures A
1
a, · · · ,Amaa for sa
8: for i = 1 to ma do
9: for each e ∈ P ia do
. Let φ(e) = (v, a)
10: ra ← {0, 1}τ





16: for each v ∈ V \ {a} s.t. Iv 6= ∅ do
. Consider the mv access structures A
1
v, · · · ,Amvv for sv
17: for j = 1 to mv do
18: sv,Ajv ← Share
j
v(sv)
19: for each e ∈ P jv s. t. e /∈ {e1, . . . , eq} do
. Let φ(e) = (z, v)
20: p(z, v)← Esz (sj,zv )
21: end for
22: if q > 1 then
23: for each e ∈ P jv s. t. e ∈ {e1, . . . , eq−1} do
. Let φ(e) = (z, v)
24: rz ← {0, 1}τ





30: for each (v, v
′
) ∈ E do
31: πv ← Esv (kv)
32: end for
33: pub′ ← public values constructed above
34: if (a, b) = (u, u′) then
35: x1 ← ku
36: else
. Consider the mb access structures A
1
b , · · · ,Ambb for sb
37: for ` = 1 to mb do
38: for each e ∈ P `b do
39: if φ(e) = (a, b) then





45: state← (s′, k, pub′, x0, x1)




Algorithm 13 Second stage of the adversary A attacking the SEBC.
1: procedure A2(1
τ , y, state)
2: state = (s′, k, pub′, x0, x1)
3: sX ← Corruptu(s′, X)
. Construction of the missing public values
4: if (a, b) = (u, u′) then
5: πu ← y
6: else
7: p(a,b) ← y
8: end if
9: d← Bq(1τ , G,AG , pub, sX , x1)
10: return d
11: end procedure
such views with non negligible advantage, it follows that algorithm A is able
to break the security of the encryption scheme Π = (K,E,D) in the sense of
IND-P1-C0. Contradiction.
Hence, for any q = 1, . . . , h, the adversary’s view in the q-th experiment is
indistinguishable from the adversary’s view in the (q + 1)-th one. Therefore, the





4.3.2 A Construction based on Threshold Broadcast En-
cryption
In this section we propose a construction for hierarchical and shared key as-
signment which uses as building block a threshold broadcast encryption scheme.
We denote such a construction as the Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based
Construction (TBEBC). The TBEBC can be instantiated using the construc-
tion proposed by Daza et al. [31], which is secure under the Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
4.3.2.1 Threshold Broadcast Encryption
A broadcast encryption scheme allows a sender to broadcast an encrypted mes-
sage to a set of users in such a way that only legitimate users can decrypt it.
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Broadcast encryption schemes can be either public-key or symmetric-key based.
In the symmetric-key setting, only a trusted authority can broadcast data to
the receivers. Conversely, in the public-key setting, a public key published by a
trusted authority allows anybody to broadcast a message.
In a threshold public key broadcast encryption scheme (TBE) a message is
encrypted and sent to a group of receivers, in such a way that the cooperation of
at least t of them (where t is the threshold) is necessary in order to recover the
original message. Such schemes have many applications in situations where one
wants to avoid that a single party has all the power/responsibility to protect or
obtain some critical information. In those schemes, the sender of the message who
wants to protect some information may want to decide who will be the designated
receivers in an ad-hoc way, just before encrypting the message, and also decide the
threshold of receivers which will be necessary to recover the information. More
precisely, a TBE scheme has the following properties:
• There is no setup phase or predefined groups. Each potential receiver has
his own pair of secret/public keys.
• The sender chooses the set of receivers P and the threshold t for the de-
cryption. Then he encrypts the message by using the public keys of all the
receivers in P.
• A ciphertext corresponding to the pair (P, t) can be decrypted only if at
least t members of P cooperate by using their secret keys. Otherwise, it is
computationally infeasible to obtain any information about the plaintext.
The next definition was proposed in [31].
Definition 4.3.2. A threshold broadcast encryption (TBE) scheme consists of
five algorithms:
1. The randomized setup algorithm TBE.Setup takes as input a security pa-
rameter 1τ and outputs some public parameters params, which will be com-
mon to all the users of the system. We write params← TBE.Setup(1τ).
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2. The randomized key generation algorithm TBE.KG is run by each user
i. It takes as input some public parameters params and returns a pair
(PKi,SKi) consisting of a public key and a matching secret key. We write
(PKi, SKi)← TBE.KG(params).
3. The randomized encryption algorithm TBE.Enc takes as input a set of
public keys {PKi}i∈P corresponding to a set P of receivers, a threshold t
satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a message m. The output is a ciphertext C. We
write C ← TBE.Enc(1τ , {PKi}i∈P, t,m).
4. The (possibly randomized) partial decryption algorithm TBE.PartDec takes
as input a ciphertext C for the pair (P,t) and a secret key SKi of a receiver
i ∈ P. The output is a partial decryption value ki or a special symbol ⊥.
We write ki ← TBE.PartDec(C, SKi).
5. The deterministic final decryption algorithm TBE.Dec takes as input a ci-
phertext C for the pair (P,t) and t partial decryptions {ki}i∈A, corresponding
to receivers in some subset A ⊂ P. The output is a message m or a special
symbol ⊥. We write m̃← TBE.Dec(C, {ki}i∈A, A).
4.3.2.2 The Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based Construction
In the following we consider the problem of constructing a hierarchical and
shared key assignment scheme by using as the building block a threshold
broadcast encryption scheme.
Rationale behind the construction. The idea behind our construction, referred
to in the following as the Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based Construction
(TBEBC), is to compute the private and public information by using the
threshold broadcast encryption scheme. More precisely, the public information
associated to each security class v will contain a public key generated by a
TBE, let PKv be such a key. Given a class v with its relative access structures
A1v, . . . ,A
mv
v and a qualified set X ∈ Ajv, for some j ∈ {1 . . .mv}, we denote with
QvX the set of classes having an outgoing edge in X. Furthermore, the public
information will contain for each set QvX a value given by the encryption of the
92
4. Constructions
secret key kv, through the public keys of all the classes in Q
v
X . Subsequently, the
public value relative to the set QvX can be decrypted through the collaboration
among all the classes that constitute this set; that is to say, through their private
keys, the classes belonging to QvX are allowed to compute the key kv.
In detail, the generation algorithm of our TBEBC takes as inputs a security
parameter 1τ , a multigraph G, and the corresponding set of families of access
structures AG. This algorithm generates a pair of public/private keys (PKv,
SKv), for each class v ∈ V . Subsequently, for each class v, we assign secret
information sv, corresponding to the private key SKv. Moreover, for each class
v, the public key PKv corresponds to the public information pubv. In addition,
for each class v, a secret key kv is generated. Again, for each class v and for each
set QvX , kv is encrypted through the public keys of the classes belonging to such a
set. Finally, this encryption is assigned to the public information associated with
the class v.
On the other hand, derivation algorithm of the TBEBC takes as inputs a
security parameter 1τ , a multigraph G, the corresponding set of families of access
structures AG, the class u to be accessed, a set Q
u
X , the private information s
u
X
associated to classes in QuX and finally, all public information pub. This algorithm
first extracts from pub the value CuX , relative to Q
u
X . Subsequently, it extracts
from suX the secret values associated to each class belonging to Q
u
X . Finally,
through these values, the partial decryptions related to CuX are computed, for
being used later to obtain the secret key ku.
Formally, let G = (V,E, φ) be a directed multigraph and let AG be a fam-
ily of access structures associated to classes in V . Let TBE = (TBE.Setup,
TBE.KG, TBE.Enc, TBE.PartDec, TBE.Dec) a threshold broadcast encryp-
tion scheme. The information generation algorithm Gen of the TBEBC is shown
in Algorithm 14, whereas, the relative key derivation algorithm Der is shown in
Algorithm 15.
4.3.2.3 Analysis of the Scheme
In the following we show that the security property of the TBEBC depends on
the security property of the underlying threshold broadcast encryption scheme.
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Algorithm 14 Gen algorithm of the Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based
Construction.
1: procedure Gen(1τ , G,AG)
2: params← TBE.Setup(1τ )
3: for each class v ∈ V do
4: (PKv, SKv)← TBE.KG(params)
5: kv ← {0, 1}τ , sv ← SKv, pubv ← PKv
. Let mv ≥ 1 be an integer
. Let P 1v , · · · , Pmvv be mv subsets of Iv
. Let A1i , · · · ,Amvv be the mv access structures for class v on the sets P 1v , · · · , Pmvv
6: for j = 1 to mv do
. Let Qv,j1 , · · · , Qv,jz be the collection of qualified sets characterizing the access
structure Ajv
7: for k = 1 to z do
. Let cardv,jk be the cardinality of the set Q
v,j
k
8: Cv,jk ← TBE.Enc(Q
v,j
k , {PK`}`∈Qv,jk , card
v,j
k , kv)





Algorithm 15 Der algorithm of the Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based
Construction.






2: Extract from pub the value CuX associated to the class u
3: for each ` ∈ QuX do
4: Extract from su
X
the secret value s` associated to the class `
5: Share` ← TBE.PartDec(CuX , s`)
6: end for






Before analyzing the security of the TBEBC, we first need to define what we mean
by a secure public-key threshold broadcast encryption scheme. In general, in such
schemes an adversary can corrupt different users in two possible ways: registering
new public keys for such users, or obtaining the secret key matching with the
public key of some previously honest users. The final goal of the adversary is to
obtain some information about a message which has been encrypted for a pair
(P∗, t∗), such that the number of corrupted players in P∗ is less than t∗. For the
ease of exposition, we consider the second kind of user corruption. More precisely,
indistinguishability for TBE schemes is defined by considering the game shown
in Figure 4.2, played by an adversary Aatk against a challenger [12].
U = ∅
params← TBE.Setup(1τ )
Each time Aatk requires the creation of a new user Ri
(PKi, SKi) ← TBE.KG(params)
U← U ∪Ri
(St, P∗, t∗, m0, m1) ← ACorr,O1atk (·)(find, params, {PKi}i∈U)
β
r←− {0, 1}
C∗ ← TBE.Enc(P∗,{pki}i∈P∗ ,t∗,mβ)
β
′ ← ACorr,O2atk (·)(guess,C∗,St)
Figure 4.2: Game played by an adversary Aatk.
In both phases of the attack, Aatk can access a corruption oracle Corr. In
particular, Aatk submits to the oracle a user i ∈ U and receives as answer the
relative secret key SKi. Let U
′ ⊂ U be the subset of users that Aatk has corrupted
during the attack. Notice that |P∗∩U′ | < t∗ must hold, otherwise, Aatk knows the
secret key of at least t∗ players in P ∗ and can decrypt C∗ autonomously, obtaining
mβ. In detail, depending on the considered type of attack, Aatk can also access a
decryption oracle for ciphertexts of his choice. As an answer, Aatk receives all the
information that would be broadcasted in a complete decryption process, that
is, all the partial decryption values and the resulting plaintext. More precisely,
if atk is a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA), then the adversary cannot access the
decryption oracle at all, i.e., O1 = O2 = ε. If atk is a partial Chosen Ciphertext
Attack (CCA1), then O1 = TBE.PartDec(·) ∪ TBE.Dec(·) and O2 = ε. Finally,
if atk is a full Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA2), then O1 = O2=TBE.PartDec(·)
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∪ TBE.Dec(·). Obviously, in the last case, ACCA2 is not allowed to query the
oracle O2 with the challenge ciphertext C
∗.
The advantage of Aatk is defined as:
Adv(Aatk) = Pr[β
′
= β] − 1
2
.
A threshold broadcast encryption scheme is said to be ε-indistinguishable
under atk attacks if Adv(Aatk) < ε for any adversary Aatk running in polynomial
time. Daza et al. [31] proposed a construction for threshold broadcast encryption
schemes and showed it to be ε-indistinguishable under different kinds of attacks.
Now we are ready to prove the next theorem.
Theorem 4.3.2. If the public-key threshold broadcast encryption scheme
TBE = (TBE.Setup, TBE.KG, TBE.Enc, TBE.PartDec, TBE.Dec) is ε-
indistinguishable under atk attacks, then the TBEBC is secure in the sense of
IND-ST.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the TBEBC is not secure in the sense
of IND-ST. Thus, there exists a multigraph G = (V,E, φ) in Γ and a class




) is non-negligible. We show how to construct a
polynomial-time adversary Aatk that, by using STATu,X , is able to break the ε-
indistinguishability of the TBE scheme used as a building block in the TBEBC.
In particular, let a be the target class, let Qa be a qualified set for a and
finally, let carda = |Qa|. The first operation performed by the challenger is the
generation of some parameters which will be used later on. The adversary Aatk
chooses two messages, m0 and m1, both having the same length. For each node
v ∈ V , Aatk asks the challenger for the creation of a new user v, along with the
relative pair of public/private keys, denoted by PKv and SKv, respectively. It is
important to remark that only public keys will be in the adversary’s view. For
each class v ∈ V , Aatk assigns the public key PKv to the public information pubv,
besides assigning a secret key kv to such a class. Again, the secret key ka regarding
the target class a is made to correspond to the message m1. Subsequently, Aatk
through its corruption oracle, corrupts a set X of users, such that a is not in
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AX . Let sX be the output of such a corruption, constituted by private keys
associated to users in X. This output is then stored in the state variable St.
After those steps, Aatk outputs some information through which it intends to
be challenged. Later, the challenger computes an encryption C∗ of a message
chosen at random between m0 and m1, relative to the qualified set Qa; let mβ be
such a message. The encryption C∗, which represents the challenge for Aatk, is
assigned to the public information for the node a, denoted by puba. By means
of the aforementioned steps, Aatk simulated the full view for the distinguisher
Ba, which is able to attack the security of TBEBC in the sense of IND-ST with
non-negligible advantage. More precisely, Ba is able to distinguish between the
encryption of ka from that of a random value. Finally, Aatk returns the same
output as Ba, denoted by d. Formally, the adversary Aatk is defined as shown in
Algorithm 16.
Algorithm 16 Functioning of the adversary ACorr,O1,O2atk attacking the TBEBC.
1: procedure ACorr,O1,O2atk (1
τ )
2: params← TBE.Setup(1τ )
3: m0,m1 ← {0, 1}τ
4: for each node v ∈ V do
. Aatk asks the challenger for the creation of a new user v
5: (PKv, SKv)← TBE.KG(params)
6: pubv ← PKv, kv ← {0, 1}τ , ka ← m1
7: end for
. Corruption of a set X of users s.t. a is not in AX . Let sX be the output of
such a corruption
8: St← sX
9: (St,Qa,carda,m0,m1)←ACorr,O1(·)atk (find, params, {PKv}v∈V )
. The challenger chooses at random a message between m0 and m1 and provides
the adversary with the encryption C∗ of such a message
10: β
r←− {0, 1}
11: C∗ ← TBE.Enc(Qa, {PKj}j∈Qa , carda,mβ)
12: puba ← C∗
. Construction of the missing public values




∗, St) returns the same d as Ba
14: end procedure
Note that if the last input for STATu,X is equal to the key hidden into the
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public value C∗, then the random variable associated to STATu,X ’s view is ex-
actly the same as in experiment ExpIND−1STATu,X , whereas, if it is a random string,
such a variable has the same distribution as the one associated to STATu,X ’s
view in experiment ExpIND−0STATu,X . Finally, Aatk outputs the same output as
STATu,X (1










) is non-negligible, it follows that the adversary Aatk
is able to break the ε-indistinguishability of the threshold broadcast encryption
scheme. Contradiction.
4.3.3 Performance Evaluation
The SEBC provides constant private information and public information linear
in the number of the edges in the multigraph G. More precisely, the public
information can be at most (|E|+ |V |)ck, where k corresponds to the size of the
secret key in this construction and c is a constant depending on the underlying
symmetric encryption scheme. For instance, c is equal to 2 for the so called XOR
construction in [11].
On the other hand, in the SEBC, for any X ⊆ V , the complexity of key
derivation depends on the set A
X
of classes that can be accessed when classes in
X collaborate together. Such a set is constructed by using a Breadth-First-Search
(BFS) on G, starting from the set X. In detail, starting from X, we visit the
multigraph G outgoing from X in all possible directions, adding classes one layer
at a time, according to the access structures associated to the classes. Thus,
besides the computational effort required by the BFS visit, the key derivation
complexity in the SEBC is characterized by a number of decryptions which is
equal to the number of classes corresponding to each layer of cooperation neces-
sary to obtain the encryption key. Finally, in addition to the above number of
decryptions, it is also necessary to employ the Recover algorithm of the perfect
secret sharing scheme for reconstructing the secret key sv.
Regarding the TBEBC, the number of public information associated to a
security class v is given by 1 + z, where z is the number of qualified sets that can
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access the class v. On the other hand, the only secret information assigned to
each class v is given by the private key generated by the TBE scheme. Instead,
concerning the complexity of key derivation, in the case of TBEBC the number
of decryptions is equal to the number of classes belonging to a given qualified set




“There are in fact two things, science and
opinion; the former begets knowledge, the latter
ignorance.”
— Hippocrates of Kos, 460 BC - 370 BC
Nowadays the current network-centric world has given rise to several security
concerns regarding access control management, which ensures that only autho-
rized users are given access to certain resources or tasks. In particular, according
to their respective roles and responsibilities, users are typically organized into
hierarchies composed of several disjoint classes (security classes). A hierarchy
is characterized by the fact that some users may have more access rights than
others, according to a top-down inclusion paradigm following specific hierarchi-
cal dependencies. A user with access rights for a given class is granted access
to objects stored in that class, as well as to all the descendant ones in the hi-
erarchy. The problem of key management for such hierarchies is referred to as
hierarchical key assignment and consists in assigning a key to each class of the
hierarchy, so that the keys for descendant classes can be efficiently obtained from
users belonging to classes at a higher level in the hierarchy.
In Chapter 2 we have explored the relations between all security notions for hi-
erarchical key assignment schemes and, in particular, we have shown that security
with respect to strong key indistinguishability is not stronger than the one with
respect to key indistinguishability. We have also proposed a general construction
yielding a hierarchical key assignment scheme offering security against strong key
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recovery, given any hierarchical key assignment scheme which guarantees security
against key recovery.
In Chapter 3 we have considered hierarchical key assignment schemes sup-
porting dynamic updates, such as insertions and deletions of classes and relations
between classes, as well as key replacements and user revocations. We have ex-
tended existing security notions for hierarchical key assignment schemes, namely,
security with respect to key indistinguishability and against key recovery, by pro-
viding the adversary with further attack abilities. Then, we have shown how
to construct a novel hierarchical key assignment scheme supporting dynamic up-
dates by using as a building block a symmetric encryption scheme. It is important
to emphasize that this is the first available scheme crafted for non-static environ-
ments, where the adversary is allowed to dynamically update the hierarchy. The
proposed construction is provably secure with respect to key indistinguishability
and requires a single computational assumption. Moreover, it provides efficient
key derivation and updating procedures, while requiring each user to store only
a single private key. For its simplicity, effectiveness and robustness the proposed
scheme may result in a fundamental practice for hierarchical access control ap-
plications in dynamic scenarios.
In Chapter 4 we have proposed an access control model with some innovative
features. In particular, starting from the consideration that in some cases, besides
the conventional hierarchical access, access should be granted to some qualified
sets of users, the above model provides the user with the ability to prevent abuse
of permissions, to define alternative access methods and to allow the separation
of duties. Such a novel access model finds a natural field of application in several
contexts. In general, our model characterizes any scenario where more than one
entity is required to gain a specific authorization. In addition, such a model is
useful in environments where it is necessary to address situations requiring special
permissions. Moreover, in this chapter we provided the first formal definition of
hierarchical and shared key assignment schemes. Again, we proposed an efficient
construction for those schemes, denoted as Shared Encryption Based Construction
(SEBC ), which assigns to each class a single private information, whereas, the
public information depends on the number of classes, as well as on the number of
edges in the hierarchy. The security of the proposed construction relies on the ones
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of the underlying encryption and secret sharing schemes. Finally, we proposed
a construction based on public-key threshold broadcast encryption, denoted as
Threshold Broadcast Encryption Based Construction (TBEBC), which assigns to
each class a single private information, whereas, the public information depends
on the number of qualified sets which can access such a class. The security of
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